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Other People’s Money 
DRAWING THE CONSTITUTIONAL LINE BETWEEN 
THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL AND CONSTRAINTS ON 
OBSTRUCTIVE FEE ADVANCEMENT IN THE  
WAKE OF UNITED STATES V. STEIN  
I.  INTRODUCTION 
In 2003, the U.S. Department of Justice (“DOJ”) issued 
its federal prosecutors a written set of guidelines to assist them 
in their investigation and prosecution of white-collar corporate 
crime.1 Specifically, these guidelines, issued in a document 
commonly known as the Thompson Memorandum,2 addressed 
the question of whether and under what circumstances 
Assistant U.S. Attorneys (“AUSAs”) conducting investigations 
into white collar crimes committed by employees and execu-
tives should bring a formal charge against the company  
itself.3 The Thompson Memo listed nine separate factors for 
prosecutors to evaluate when making the decision of whether 
or not to seek an indictment.4 
In the AUSAs’ determination of whether to prosecute a 
company, the Thompson Memo stressed consideration of the 
  
 1 Memorandum from Larry Thompson, Deputy Attorney General to the 
Heads of Department Components, United States Attorneys (Jan. 20, 2003) 
[hereinafter Thompson Memo], available at http://www.usdoj.gov/dag/cftf/business_ 
organizations.pdf. 
 2 Christopher A. Wray & Robert K. Hur, Corporate Criminal Prosecution in 
a Post-Enron World: The Thompson Memo in Theory and Practice, 43 AM. CRIM. L. 
REV. 1095, 1096 (2006).  
 3 Thompson Memo, supra note 1, at 1-2. 
 4 Id. at 3; see also Paul J. McNulty, Deputy Attorney General, DOJ, 
Statement Before the Committee on the Judiciary United States Senate Concerning 
“The Thompson Memorandum’s Effect on the Right to Counsel in Corporate 
Investigations” (Sept. 12, 2006) [hereinafter McNulty Statement], available at 
http://judiciary.senate.gov/testimony.cfm?id=2054&wit_id=2742. 
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authenticity of a company’s “cooperation” with the government 
investigation.5 One measure of this cooperation was whether 
the company was advancing legal fees to its investigated 
employees.6 If the company possessed no legal obligation to 
advance legal fees to its implicated employees in connection 
with the investigation, then the AUSAs prosecuting the case, in 
accordance with the guidelines, were permitted to view the 
advancement of legal fees as a failure to cooperate with the 
government.7  
However, this practice was recently condemned in a pair 
of decisions issued by Judge Lewis Kaplan of the Southern 
District of New York in United States v. Stein.8 In the first 
decision, issued in June 2006 (“Stein I”), the DOJ’s practice of 
considering the advancement of legal fees as a failure to 
cooperate was challenged by former employees of accounting 
giant Klynveld, Peat, Marwick, Goerdeler9 (“KPMG”).10 The 
DOJ had begun an investigation of KPMG and its employees 
over the “development, marketing and implementation of 
abusive tax shelters.”11 The DOJ sought cooperation from the 
KPMG employees suspected of misconduct as well as from 
KPMG as a company.12 In doing so, the AUSAs leading the 
investigation inquired into KPMG’s legal obligation to advance 
fees to its employees.13 When KPMG could show a history of 
advancing legal fees, but could not show any clear legal 
obligation to do so, the prosecutors pressured KPMG into 
limiting such assistance to its employees to demonstrate its 
  
 5 Thompson Memo, supra note 1, at 6. 
 6 Id. at 7-8.  
 7 Id. However, as will be discussed infra in Part II, this consideration was 
limited by certain factors in an effort to eliminate the risk of abuse by prosecutors. See 
McNulty Statement, supra note 4.  
 8 United States v. Stein (Stein I), 435 F. Supp. 2d 330 (S.D.N.Y. 2006); 
United States v. Stein (Stein III), 495 F. Supp. 2d 390 (S.D.N.Y. 2007). See infra note 
23. 
 9 KPMG: Our History, http://www.kpmg.com/About/Who/History (last visited 
Mar. 26, 2008); Stein I, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 336. 
 10 Stein I, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 338; Lynnley Browning, Prosecutor Says KPMG 
Move Held No Sway, N.Y. TIMES, May 10, 2006, at C13 [hereinafter Browning, KPMG 
No Sway]. 
 11 Stein I, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 336, 338 (internal citations omitted). For a more 
detailed description of the illegal tax shelter abuses alleged by the government, see 
David Cay Johnston, U.S. Accuses 2 Audit Firms of Assisting Tax Violations, N.Y. 
TIMES, July 10, 2002, at C1.  
 12 Stein I, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 341.  
 13 Id.; Browning, KPMG No Sway, supra note 10.  
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cooperation with the government and possibly avoid an 
indictment against the company.14 
The KPMG defendants claimed, and the Stein I court 
agreed, that the pressure placed on KPMG to disregard its 
“long-standing policy”15 of advancing legal fees to employees 
being investigated or indicted deprived the employees of  
their Sixth Amendment right to the assistance of counsel.16 
Alternatively, the court held that this pressure violated the 
defendants’ substantive due process right to a fair criminal 
trial under the Fifth Amendment.17 The court noted that: 
KPMG refused to pay because the government held the proverbial 
gun to its head. Had that pressure not been brought to bear, KPMG 
would have paid these defendants’ legal expenses. Those who commit 
crimes—regardless of whether they wear white or blue collars— 
must be brought to justice. The government, however, has let its zeal 
get in the way of its judgment. . . . Defendants had . . . an 
expectation that their expenses in defending any claims or charges 
brought against them by reason of their employment by KPMG 
would be paid by the firm. The law protects such interests against 
unjustified and improper interference.18 
Because the court intended its substantive due process analysis 
to be used only as an alternative in the event that a reviewing 
court disagreed with its Sixth Amendment analysis,19 this  
Note will focus primarily on the protections the Stein court 
recognized under the Sixth Amendment. 
In its decision in Stein I, the court first determined  
that KPMG would have advanced—and may even have been 
legally obligated to advance—legal fees to its employees.20  
This determination was based on a state statute that gives 
companies the authority to indemnify their employees through 
means which include the advancement of legal fees, as well as 
on KPMG’s history of paying the legal expenses of its partners 
and employees incurred as a result of their employment, 
  
 14 Stein I, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 342, 344. 
 15 Id. at 352; Browning, KPMG No Sway, supra note 10. 
 16 Stein I, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 336; Lynnley Browning, U.S. Tactic on  
KPMG Questioned, N.Y. TIMES, June 28, 2006, at C1 [hereinafter Browning, Tactic 
Questioned]. 
 17 Stein I, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 356, 360; see also Stein III, 495 F. Supp. 2d 390, 
409 n.80 (S.D.N.Y. 2007).  
 18 Stein I, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 336, 366-67. 
 19 Stein III, 495 F. Supp. 2d at 409 n.80. 
 20 Stein I, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 353, 356; see also Stein III, 495 F. Supp. 2d at 
394, 409.  
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regardless of cost.21 Next, the court found that the inherent 
threat of an indictment based on the guidelines in the 
Thompson Memo and the pressure supplied by the AUSAs’ 
reinforcement of that threat caused KPMG to depart from its 
usual policy of paying legal fees and expenses.22  
These holdings were confirmed in July 2007 when  
the court issued a second opinion (“Stein III”23) in which it 
dismissed the indictments of a number of the defendants and 
rejected arguments by the government challenging the correct-
ness of the court’s rulings in Stein I.24 The Stein III court 
reinforced its holdings in Stein I by pointing to additional facts 
that showed KPMG’s intent and desire to cover its employees’ 
legal fees.25 However, the Stein decisions are subject to a 
number of weaknesses that limit their effectiveness in 
preventing government prosecutors from infringing on the 
right to counsel while preserving the government’s interest in 
prosecuting white collar crime.26  
First, in arriving at its conclusions, the court was forced 
to engage in a long, murky, and protracted analysis of the 
facts27 that may subject its conclusions to alternative interpre-
tation by other courts facing similar claims in the future.28 
Second, the claim of prosecutorial misconduct presented by the 
  
 21 Stein I, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 355-56; Stein III, 495 F. Supp. 2d at 405-09. 
 22 Stein I, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 352.  
 23 The second decision is referred to as Stein III for purposes of consistency 
with the court, which referred to a July 2006 decision concerning suppression of 
statements made by the KPMG defendants as “Stein II.” See infra note 198.  
 24 Stein III, 495 F. Supp. 2d at 393-94.  
 25 Id. at 407-09. 
 26 The Stein I court held that the defendants’ right to “obtain and 
use . . . resources lawfully available to him or her” in preparing a defense “free of 
knowing or reckless government interference” is a fundamental constitutional right 
protected under notions of substantive due process. 435 F. Supp. 2d at 360-62. Any 
government infringement of this right is subject to a strict scrutiny standard of 
review—the government’s actions must be “narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling 
government interest.” Id. at 362. As the Sixth Amendment right to counsel has also 
repeatedly been declared “fundamental” by the Supreme Court, see Cuyler v. Sullivan, 
446 U.S. 335, 343 (1980); Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 32 (1972); Gideon v. 
Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963), any government interest which would impede 
this right of a criminal defendant must also be compelling. 
 27 The difficulty of the analysis for the Stein court is demonstrated by its 
reliance in Stein III on additional pieces of evidence, at least one of which had not been 
discovered, when it confirmed its conclusions and holding in Stein I. See Stein III, 495 
F. Supp. 2d at 407. 
 28 See Browning, Tactic Questioned, supra note 16 (reporting that while the 
district court ruling applies only to the KPMG case, it carries extra weight because of 
the large number of “high profile white-collar and corporate fraud cases” presented 
before the federal court in Manhattan).  
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defendants in the Stein cases still leaves courts unable to 
protect the right to the assistance of counsel for defendants 
until after that right has been violated. Finally, as in Stein, the 
need to hear such claims may force courts into the unwanted 
position of intruding on a prosecutor’s broad discretion to 
determine whether or not to seek an indictment.29 Since the 
decision to seek an indictment rests with the executive branch, 
judicial review of a prosecutor’s authority threatens to under-
mine the doctrine of separation of powers.30 
This Note will argue that while modern application  
of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel31 could cover a 
company’s agreement to advance attorney’s fees in certain 
instances, the Stein decisions are only minimally effective in 
ascertaining where such coverage applies. First, the Stein 
decisions do not clearly distinguish between conduct constitu-
ting impermissible government interference with the right  
to counsel and voluntary choices of companies denying 
advancement to employees based on decisions which serve the 
companies’ best interests.32 This requires an alternative 
solution to provide prosecutors with a clearer gauge of where 
government conduct exceeds the proper balance between 
prosecution of white-collar crime and individual constitutional 
rights. Second, such a solution must not excessively intrude on 
the government’s compelling interest in prosecuting white-
collar crime and limiting obstructive conduct.  
Part II of this Note will review the history of the DOJ’s 
implementation of the guidelines set forth in the Thompson 
Memo and recap the history of the guidelines as set forth five 
years before the DOJ brought action against the KPMG 
employees. A brief history of the KPMG investigation will be 
provided to re-establish the setting that brought these issues to 
  
 29 See Stein I, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 359. 
 30  See infra notes 261-262 and accompanying text. 
 31 Much has been written regarding the intent behind the right to counsel in 
the years preceding and immediately following American independence. See, e.g., 
WILLIAM M. BEANEY, THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN AMERICAN COURTS 14-24 (1955); 
ELLIOTT EVANS CHEATHAM, A LAWYER WHEN NEEDED 14, 49-50 (1963); William M. 
Beaney, The Effective Assistance of Counsel, in ARTHUR L. HARDING ET AL., 
FUNDAMENTAL LAW IN CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS 39, 39-40 (1959). However, this Note 
will primarily focus on the last seventy years of Sixth Amendment jurisprudence 
dealing with the right to counsel. 
 32 See Advanced Mining Sys., Inc. v. Fricke, 623 A.2d 82, 84 (Del. Ch. 1992) 
(explaining that Delaware law leaves to the business judgment of the board “the task of 
determining whether . . . advancement of expenses would on balance be likely to 
promote [a] corporation’s interests”).  
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light, including specific incidences within the investigation that 
gave rise to some of the claims of abuse and misconduct that 
this Note’s proposal attempts to remedy. Part III will briefly 
restate the scope, application, and limits of the Sixth Amend-
ment right to counsel to highlight the protections guaranteed 
by the right. Part III will also discuss the district court’s 
application of the right to the facts in the Stein cases. 
Part IV will analyze the district court’s decisions in 
Stein I and III. This analysis will highlight the weaknesses of 
the court’s decisions and focus on balancing the need to grant 
prosecutors the necessary discretion to determine whether to 
bring charges while protecting individuals and companies from 
potential abuse of that discretion. This section will include 
analysis of state statutes addressing indemnification and 
advancement of legal fees to officers and employees. 
Part V will propose a bright-line alternative to aid 
courts and prosecutors in determining when a defendant’s right 
to the assets of a third party for the payment of legal fees is 
protected under the Sixth Amendment and when (and under 
what circumstances) government interference is appropriate. 
The proposal will resurrect a portion of the AUSAs’ claim that 
the Sixth Amendment right to counsel does not cover “other 
people’s money” in the form of a legislative enactment 
permitting prosecutors to use preliminary injunctive restraints 
that are already in use with current federal forfeiture 
provisions.  
II.  BACKGROUND 
A.  The Thompson Memorandum 
Formally titled “Principles of Federal Prosecution of 
Business Organizations,” the Thompson Memo was issued by 
Deputy Attorney General Larry Thompson as a “revised set  
of principles to guide33 Department Prosecutors as they make 
  
 33 While the memo explicitly states that the principles are intended as a 
“guide” for prosecutors, some analysts, as well as the court in Stein have concluded 
that the principles were used as hard rules in their assessments of corporate 
cooperation and determinations to bring an indictment. See, e.g., Lynnley Browning, 
Judges Press Companies That Cut Off Legal Fees, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 17, 2006, at C1 
[hereinafter Browning, Judges Press] (pointing out that while prosecutors claim that 
the Thompson Memo was meant to serve as an internal guide for prosecutors, many 
prosecutors use the guidelines “like a bible” when investigating a company); Stein I, 
435 F. Supp. 2d at 338 (“[T]he Thompson Memorandum is binding on all federal 
prosecutors. Thus, all United States Attorneys now are obliged to consider the 
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the decision of whether to seek charges against a business 
organization.”34 It was issued in the wake of a number of 
corporate scandals involving high-profile companies such as 
MCI WorldCom, HealthSouth, and Adelphia35 that followed 
shortly after the collapse of Enron.36 These scandals “cost 
investors billions of dollars and thousands of workers lost their 
jobs,”37 and they compelled the DOJ to take action against the 
corporate malfeasors.38 
While guiding prosecutors in their consideration of 
seeking an indictment against a company was at least one 
purpose of the Thompson Memo,39 one of its primary purposes 
was to “increase[] emphasis on and scrutiny of the authenticity 
of a corporation’s cooperation” with the DOJ’s investigation.40 
Prosecutors from the DOJ had always sought cooperation  
from companies during the investigation of potentially illegal 
conduct,41 but the content of the Thompson Memo lends itself  
  
advancing of legal fees by business entities . . . as at least possibly indicative of an 
attempt to protect culpable employees and as a factor weighing in favor of indictment 
of the entity.” (footnote omitted)).  
 34 Thompson Memo, supra note 1, cover page. The memo was actually a 
“modest revision” of a document issued in June 1999 by then-U.S. Deputy Attorney 
General Eric Holder entitled “Federal Prosecution of Corporations,” commonly referred 
to as the “Holder Memo.” Stein I, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 336; see also Wray & Hur, supra 
note 2, at 1099 (characterizing the Holder Memo as the first “uniform policy on 
corporate prosecution”).  
 35 Wray & Hur, supra note 2, at 1100. 
 36 Browning, Judges Press, supra note 33. Speaking before Congress, Deputy 
Attorney General Paul McNulty called the year 2002 “a time of great concern to . . . 
Congress and to American workers and investors” based on the reduction in the 
public’s trust in corporate America due to the “large-scale bankruptcies of companies 
like Enron.” McNulty Statement, supra note 4. “The guidance contained in the 
Thompson Memorandum . . . must be viewed in the context of these massive corporate 
scandals.” Id.  
 37 Browning, Judges Press, supra note 33.  
 38 As McNulty testified: 
The American people and their representatives . . . in Congress demanded 
that those responsible for corporate malfeasance be brought to 
justice . . . . The Department of Justice responded to this crisis in corporate 
America with vigor and action . . . . Since 2002, the Department of Justice 
obtained more than 1000 corporate fraud convictions and convicted more 
than 160 corporate presidents and executive officers. 
McNulty Statement, supra note 4.  
 39 The Thompson Memo also discussed the important public benefits that 
would flow from corporate prosecution, such as the likelihood that the company will 
take “immediate remedial steps,” specific deterrence in the form of a changed culture in 
the indicted corporation, and minimized risks of large-scale public harm, such as 
environmental crimes and financial fraud. Thompson Memo, supra note 1, cover page. 
 40 Id.; Wray & Hur, supra note 2, at 1097, 1135. 
 41 See McNulty Statement, supra note 4 (calling the Thompson Memo “a 
time-tested and fair summary of the factors a prosecutor considers in charging a 
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to the inference that the DOJ and Thompson had become 
skeptical of the cooperation they were receiving: “Too often 
business organizations, while purporting to cooperate with a 
Department investigation, in fact take steps to impede the 
quick and effective exposure of the complete scope of 
wrongdoing under investigation.”42  
The Thompson Memo, which acknowledged that only  
a minority of cases would result in a company itself being 
subjected to criminal charges,43 listed a number of factors for 
prosecutors to consider in determining whether to bring 
charges against an entity.44 Some of these factors were identical 
to those that prosecutors were already using to determine 
whether to bring charges against individuals, such as 
sufficiency of the evidence, success at trial, deterrence, 
rehabilitation, and alternative consequences of conviction.45 
However, due to a company’s status as a “corporate person,” 
additional factors were given for consideration.46 These factors 
included, but were not limited to, the nature and seriousness of 
the offense, the extent of the wrongdoing within the company, 
the history of such conduct, voluntary disclosure of any 
wrongdoing by the company and willingness to cooperate,47 
corporate compliance programs, remedial measures (including 
  
corporate entity [that] commits to paper what good prosecutors have been doing for 
decades”).  
 42 Thompson Memo, supra note 1, cover page. This skepticism was even 
shared by attorneys working as in-house counsel for private companies under 
investigation as little as three months prior to the decision handed down in Stein I. See 
Nathan Koppel, U.S. Pressures Firms Not to Pay Staff Legal Fees, WALL ST. J., Mar. 28, 
2006, at B1 (quoting Harvey Wolkoff, an in-house lawyer for Enterasys Networks, Inc., 
supporting government requests that Enterasys challenge Delaware law authorizing 
advancement of legal fees to the defendants: “‘If [the defendants] did something 
criminal, why should’ their legal fees get reimbursed?”). 
 43 Thompson Memo, supra note 1, cover page. This was in part due to the 
recognition that a company “can act only through individuals,” and that “imposition of 
individual criminal liability may provide the strongest deterrent against future 
corporate wrongdoing.” Id. at 1; see also Wray & Hur, supra note 2, at 1106-07. 
 44 Thompson Memo, supra note 1, at 3.  
 45 Prosecutors had already been instructed to consider these factors in 
seeking indictments against individual defendants, as the factors had already been 
listed in the United States Attorneys Manual. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, U.S. 
ATTORNEY’S MANUAL § 9-27.220 (2007).  
 46 Thompson Memo, supra note 1, at 3. 
 47 In evaluating cooperation, the prosecutors could also consider whether a 
company waived corporate attorney-client and work product protection. Id. at 3. One 
reason the DOJ began looking at waivers of privilege and work product is that in 
previous corporate criminal investigations, counsel for the companies would run all of 
the companies’ documentation through their in-house legal department so as to claim 
attorney-client or work product protection for documentation detailing routine business 
activity as well as accounting and financial records. McNulty Statement, supra note 4.  
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termination of responsible employees and making restitution), 
and the collateral effects of a potential indictment (including 
harm to shareholders, pension holders, and non-culpable 
employees).48  
In elaborating on the consideration that should be given 
to a company’s level of cooperation, the Thompson Memo 
acknowledged the difficulties of conducting an investigation of 
a company, such as ascertaining who the culpable individuals 
are, their location, and the location of records.49 These diffi-
culties made obtaining company cooperation so critical that  
the Memo referenced guidelines for prosecutors to consider  
in determining whether to offer the company immunity or 
amnesty in the form of a non-prosecution agreement.50 The 
Memo also stated that prosecutors should assess whether the 
company “appears to be protecting its culpable employees.”51 
This protection referred to company conduct that included 
advancing attorney’s fees, retention of employees without 
sanction for any misconduct, and providing information to 
employees about the government’s investigation.52 As it 
pertained to legal fees, if prosecutors felt that such protection 
was being used to limit or prevent the flow of truthful commu-
nication from employees to the government, or to protect the 
culpable employees or the company, such provision of fees could 
be weighed in evaluating the adequacy of cooperation.53 
  
 48 Thompson Memo, supra note 1, at 3.  
 49 Id. at 6. 
It will often be difficult to determine which individual took which action on 
behalf of the corporation. Lines of authority and responsibility may be shared 
among operating divisions . . . and records and personnel may be spread 
throughout the United States . . . . Where the criminal conduct continued 
over an extended period of time, the culpable or knowledgeable personnel 
may have been promoted, transferred, or fired, or they may have quit or 
retired. Accordingly, a corporation’s cooperation may be critical in identifying 
the culprits and locating relevant evidence. 
Id.  
 50 Id.; Wray & Hur, supra note 2, at 1103-04. 
 51 Thompson Memo, supra note 1, at 7.  
 52 Id. at 7-8. The Memo also addressed other concerns regarding whether an 
investigated company is engaged in conduct that impedes the investigation, such as 
making overly broad assertions of corporate representation of employees, and issuing 
directions to its employees not to cooperate. Id.  
 53 McNulty Statement, supra note 4. The DOJ was primarily concerned about 
the abuse of fee advancement as a means of obstructing the government’s investigation 
in conjunction with other indications of non-cooperation, such as “overly broad 
assertions of corporate representation of its employees, a refusal to sanction wrong-
doers, a failure to comply with document subpoenas and a failure to preserve 
documents.” Id. To the extent that these other indicators were not present, the 
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B.  The Investigation of KPMG54 
The DOJ used the guidelines set out in the Thompson 
Memo when it began its investigation of KPMG.55 In October 
2001, the IRS initiated an investigation into the creation of and 
failure to register a number of “abusive” tax shelters that 
KPMG had participated in forming beginning in 1997.56 
Following the initiation of the investigation, as well as the 
issuance of a number of summonses for information on  
these abusive shelters,57 a Senate subcommittee launched 
another investigation “into the development, marketing and 
implementation” of these shelters.58 The subcommittee found 
that KPMG sold a number of these illegal shelters to at least 
350 people in the four year span from 1997 to 2001.59 In 
addition, KPMG earned $124 million in fees, while depriving 
the Treasury of at least $1.4 billion in unpaid taxes.60 These 
investigations brought much negative attention to KPMG.61  
As concern grew regarding the fallout from the 
conclusions of the Senate subcommittee and IRS investiga-
tions, KPMG chair Eugene O’Kelly retained a private law firm 
in an effort to develop a “cooperative approach” with the 
government.62 This approach included the decision to ask some 
of KPMG’s senior partners to vacate their positions within the 
company, including deputy chair and Chief Operating Officer 
Jeffrey Stein, vice-chair of tax services Richard Smith, and a 
partner in personal financial planning, Jeffrey Eischid.63 
However, in terminating their employments, KPMG negotiated 
  
government would not maintain such concern with a company’s advancement of legal 
fees. Id.  
 54 For purposes of simplicity, Part II.B will assume many of the facts of the 
investigation as they were determined by the court in Stein I and later in Stein III. 
 55 Stein I, 435 F. Supp. 2d 330, 341 (S.D.N.Y. 2006). 
 56 Id. at 338; see also Johnston, supra note 11; Superseding Indictment at 36-
37, Stein I, 435 F. Supp. 2d 330 (No. S1 05 Cr. 0888) [hereinafter KPMG Indictment].  
 57 KPMG Indictment, supra note 56, at 37. 
 58 Stein I, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 338.  
 59 Lynnley Browning, KPMG Says Tax Shelters Involved Wrongdoing, N.Y. 
TIMES, June 17, 2005, at C1. 
 60 Id. Some sources have reported claims by prosecutors that the shelters cost 
the United States even more than this amount. See Bloomberg News, KPMG Is Not 
Required to Pay Legal Fees, U.S. Contends, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 29, 2006, at C9 (reporting 
that the shelters generated over $11 billion in falsely claimed tax losses, and cost the 
government at least $2 billion in revenue). 
 61 Stein I, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 338-39.  
 62 Id. at 339. 
 63 Id. 
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severance agreements with at least two of these individuals, 
specifically Messrs. Stein and Smith.64  
Mr. Stein, who held a senior position with the company, 
worked out an agreement with KPMG in which his departure 
would be “cushioned substantially.”65 Under this agreement, 
Mr. Stein would be retained as a consultant for three years 
with a monthly compensation of $100,000, would release all 
claims against the firm and its partners, and would be provided 
legal representation at the expense of the firm by counsel 
acceptable to both him and the firm in any suits brought 
against KPMG or its personnel and himself.66 KPMG would 
also continue to cover Mr. Stein under its Professional 
Indemnity Insurance Program against any claims arising from 
his role with the company.67 KPMG’s agreement with Mr. 
Smith contained an essentially identical clause, by which the 
firm agreed to pay the costs of Smith’s defense.68 
In early 2004, the IRS concluded its investigation and 
made a criminal referral to the DOJ recommending prosecution 
of KPMG.69 The DOJ, in turn, referred the case to the United 
States Attorney’s Office (“USAO”) in February of that year.70 
Upon learning of the criminal referral, but prior to any meeting 
with the USAO, KPMG issued a voicemail message to its 
partners stating that it would pay for “competent counsel” for 
any present or former members of the firm who were asked to 
appear before the USAO in relation to the investigation.71 The 
message made no mention of any conditions on the payment, 
nor did it mention any limits on the amount of legal expenses 
KPMG would pay.72  
In the initial discussions between the USAO and the 
retained counsel for KPMG, the AUSAs immediately inquired 
whether KPMG was paying the legal fees of the investigated 
  
 64 Id.; Stein III, 495 F. Supp. 2d at 408. 
 65 Stein I, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 339. 
 66 Id. It was also agreed that in the event that only Mr. Stein was named as a 
party in any suit arising out of his actions with the company, the counsel need only be 
reasonably acceptable to him. Id.  
 67 Id. at 339 n.25; see also Lynnley Browning, Prosecutor Denies Pressure on 
KPMG to Cut Off Legal Fees, N.Y. TIMES, May 9, 2006, at C7 [hereinafter Browning, 
Prosecutor Denies Pressure] (reporting the value of the severance package to Mr. Stein 
at between $8 and $10 million). 
 68 Stein III, 495 F. Supp. 2d at 408.  
 69 Stein I, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 339.  
 70 Id. at 340. 
 71 Stein III, 495 F. Supp. 2d at 407. 
 72 Id. 
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employees and what obligations or agreements it had made to 
do so.73 KPMG’s counsel indicated that the company’s objective 
was not to protect its employees, but rather to save itself out of 
the fear that a formal indictment would be disastrous for the 
company, forcing the firm out of business.74 As such, while 
lawyers for KPMG told the AUSAs that paying legal fees for 
employees had been the firm’s “common practice,”75 the vague-
ness of the firm’s partnership agreement and the Delaware law 
governing the agreement gave KPMG the discretion to make 
its own determination.76 Counsel for KPMG also indicated that 
in spite of this “common practice,” it “still was checking on its 
legal obligations,” and would not pay legal fees “for employees 
  
 73 Stein I, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 346. Prior to the court’s decision in Stein I, the 
parties had stipulated that before February 2004, KPMG had a “longstanding 
voluntary practice” of advancing and paying legal fees  
without a preset cap or condition of cooperation with the government, for 
counsel for partners, principals, and employees of the firm in those situations 
where separate counsel was appropriate to represent the individual in any 
civil, criminal or regulatory proceeding involving activities arising within the 
scope of the individual’s duties and responsibilities as a KPMG partner, 
principal, or employee.  
Id. at 340 (emphasis added, internal citations omitted).  
 74 Id. at 341. Stein I references the widely discussed and accepted conclusion 
that KPMG’s primary concern was making sure it did not suffer the same fate as its 
competitor, Arthur Andersen LLP, id., which “imploded shortly after its indictment in 
2002 for allegedly obstructing the government’s investigation of fraud at Enron Corp.” 
Koppel, supra note 42; see also Browning, Judges Press, supra note 33 (calling a formal 
indictment “a virtual death knell for many companies, as it was for the accounting firm 
Arthur Andersen”); Bruce D. Fisher, Andersen v. U.S.: A Shift in the Legal Winds for 
Public Auditors? TENN. BAR J., Nov. 2005, at 22 (stating that “mere indictment—
formal criminal accusation—proved to be the Andersen firm’s downfall” because 
following the indictment, “Andersen’s clients deserted it, and the firm eventually filed 
for bankruptcy and thousands lost their jobs and pensions”). The consequences of such 
negative publicity can be further seen by the fact that after Andersen was both indicted 
and convicted on trial, even the over-turning of the conviction by the United States 
Supreme Court “probably does not portend a significant change in the legal winds for 
either Andersen or for the thousands of former Andersen employees.” Id. at 32.  
 75 Stein I, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 342. KPMG claimed, and the DOJ did not 
dispute, that it could not recall any partner, principal, or employee who had been 
indicted for conduct arising within the scope of the duties of their position since two 
previous employees (both partners) were indicted in 1974. Id. at 340. Though the 
company could locate no documentation to support its claim that it paid pre- and post-
indictment fees on behalf of those individuals, both sides stipulated that litigation 
expenses for those employees were covered by KPMG. Id.  
 76 Id. at 342. Even after Stein I, the DOJ still emphasized that where a 
company has discretion in its business decision not to advance legal fees, it is the 
company’s choice alone and is not controlled by the prosecution. McNulty Statement, 
supra note 4, at 7. “Experienced and sophisticated counsels weigh what is in the best 
interests of the corporation and its shareholders. . . . With the level of skill of opposing 
counsel we have in these cases, it is wrong to suggest that we make their decisions for 
them.” Id.  
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who declined to cooperate with the government . . . as long as  
it had discretion to take that position.”77 Sensing the govern-
ment’s displeasure at the idea of severance packages for 
suspected individuals, KPMG chose not to sign the agreement 
it had negotiated with Richard Smith, which was still pending 
at the time of the initial meeting with the AUSAs.78 
Shortly thereafter, counsel for KPMG reported to the 
USAO that the firm did not believe any “binding legal 
obligation to pay legal fees” existed, “but that ‘it would be a big 
problem’ not to do so” due to the firm’s structure as a 
partnership.79 KPMG announced in a form letter to its 
employees that it would advance the legal fees but would limit 
the amount it paid to up to $400,000 per individual and that 
payment of the fees would be conditioned on that particular 
employee being fully cooperative with the government and the 
firm.80 The form letter also stated that if any of its employees 
were charged with criminal wrongdoing, payment of legal  
fees would cease immediately.81 After viewing the letter, the 
USAO for the most part took no issue with the company’s 
announcement and proceeded in its investigation.82 
During the course of the investigation, when the AUSAs 
felt that the company personnel they were investigating were 
failing to adequately cooperate, the AUSAs would notify 
KPMG.83 Counsel for the company would then inform the 
attorneys for the individuals that legal fees would be 
  
 77 Stein I, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 342 (emphasis added). One of the AUSAs 
present at the initial meeting made a statement in reference to “federal guidelines” 
that misconduct was not to be rewarded. Id. While intended by the AUSA as a 
reference to federal sentencing guidelines, it was understood by counsel for KPMG as a 
reference to the Thompson Memo, id. at 342 n.45, and “as a reminder that payment of 
legal fees by KPMG, beyond any that it might legally be obligated to pay, could well 
count against KPMG in the government’s decision whether to indict the firm,” id. at 
344. The court also determined that another AUSA present at the meeting made a 
comment that discretion regarding payment of legal fees would be looked at “under a 
microscope,” even though the comment appeared only in the notes of one attorney for 
KPMG, and no witness who testified at the hearing recalled the statement being made. 
Id. at 344, 344 n.52. 
 78 Stein III, 495 F. Supp. 2d at 408-09. 
 79 Stein I, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 344, 345; see also Browning, Prosecutor Denies 
Pressure, supra note 67 (“Partnerships like KPMG typically pay an employees legal 
fees. Nonetheless, KPMG had a choice.”). 
 80 Stein I, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 345; see also Mark Hamblett, Lawyers Spar over 
KPMG Legal Defense Fee Policy, N.Y. L.J., May 9, 2006, at 1.  
 81 Stein I, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 345-46; Hamblett, supra note 80, at 1. 
 82 Stein I, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 346; see also Stein III, 495 F. Supp. 2d at 404 
(referring to the government as “perfectly happy” to let KPMG advance the fees subject 
to those conditions). 
 83 Stein I, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 347. 
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terminated absent indication from the government that the 
employees in question ceased in their refusal to participate in 
government interviews.84 In some cases, the individuals 
relented under the pressure from KPMG’s threats and 
participated in the interviews.85 For those who refused, KPMG 
terminated their employment and cut off payment of their 
fees.86  
Subsequent meetings between the government and 
counsel for KPMG revealed the severance packages that had 
been granted to certain executives, including the one provided 
for Mr. Stein.87 The Stein agreement became a particularly 
thorny issue88 for both sides for two reasons. First, the agree-
ment had no real restrictions or conditions on the payment of 
legal fees, which was inconsistent with KPMG’s earlier 
statements to the government with regard to limitations it 
would impose on such payments to current employees under 
investigation.89 Second, the amount that KPMG spent on Mr. 
Stein’s defense—over $640,000 for the criminal investigation 
alone—clearly exceeded any amount KPMG had represented to 
the AUSAs that it would pay in legal fees for employees.90 
Despite the cooperation KPMG had shown with respect to its 
remaining employees who were subject to investigation, the 
government’s discontent with such rich severance packages 
and the risk that it would be perceived as a failure to cooperate 
greatly concerned KPMG.91 In May 2005, the company severed 
the consulting agreement with Stein and cut off payment of his 
legal fees in an effort to display full cooperation with the 
government under the guidelines of the Thompson Memo.92 
  
 84 Id. 
 85 Id.; see also Stein III, 495 F. Supp. 2d at 404 (stating that by allowing 
KPMG to advance legal fees to its employee-defendants in the pre-indictment 
investigation stage, but subject to conditions of full cooperation, the government 
obtained leverage over the defendants through KPMG by “hold[ing] over their head 
their job”). 
 86 Stein I, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 347. 
 87 Id.  
 88 Id. at 347-48. The agreement KPMG negotiated with Mr. Smith did not 
raise an issue with the AUSAs because KPMG refused to effectuate it once it sensed 
the pressure from the government. See Stein III, 495 F. Supp. 2d at 409. 
 89 Stein I, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 347-48. 
 90 Id. at 348, nn.74, 80. 
 91 Id. at 347. The chief of the criminal division of the United States Attorney’s 
Office, relayed to KPMG counsel and executives that such severance packages are a 
“troubling issue under the ‘Thompson Memo,’” id. 344 n.51, which led to the firm 
viewing the severance agreements as a “ticking bomb,” id. at 347. 
 92 Id. at 348; see also Browning, Tactic Questioned, supra note 16.  
2008] OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY 1129 
In late August 2005, the first nine indictments of 
individual KPMG employees, including that of Jeffrey Stein, 
were handed down by a federal grand jury.93 As per the terms 
of advancement that it had disclosed to the USAO, the 
company ceased payments of legal fees for the indicted 
defendants.94 Around that same period, KPMG and the 
government entered into a Deferred Prosecution Agreement 
(“DPA”).95 Among the terms of the DPA were that KPMG would 
pay $456 million in penalties, would forego the indictment 
process and be charged with one count of conspiracy to defraud 
the government, and would admit to criminal wrongdoing.96 In 
exchange, the government would not prosecute the company, 
contingent on KPMG’s continued cooperation with the govern-
ment’s investigation in accordance with the requirements of 
the DPA and the acceptance of certain restrictions on its tax 
practice.97 Shortly thereafter, in January 2006, the KPMG 
defendants challenged the actions of the AUSAs authorized by 
the Thompson Memo, claiming, among other things, that the 
government interfered with their Sixth Amendment right to 
  
 93 Jonathan Weil, Nine Are Charged in KPMG Case on Tax Shelters, WALL 
ST. J., Aug. 30, 2005, at C1. The indictments also named former senior tax chiefs 
Richard Smith and John Lanning, as well as Raymond Ruble, a former partner at the 
New York office of the law firm Sidley Austin Brown & Wood LLP, for his part in 
writing legal opinions supporting the tax shelters. Id. The indictments also disclosed 
allegations that “at least 14 KPMG partners used some of the shelters in question to 
shave their own tax bills.” Id. In all, sixteen indictments were handed down by May 
2006, a little over a month before the Stein I decision. See Browning, Prosecutor Denies 
Pressure, supra note 67 (referring to the “tax shelter trial of 16 former employees of the 
accounting firm KPMG”).  
 94 Stein I, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 350.  
 95 Weil, supra note 93. 
 96 Id. The DPA between KPMG and the government has been reported as a 
victory for the company because it “gives the firm a chance to avoid the kind of criminal 
case that proved fatal for . . . Arthur Andersen.” Jonathan D. Glater, KPMG’s Gain, 
Partners’ Loss, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 29, 2005, at C1; see also supra note 74 and 
accompanying text. 
 97 Weil, supra note 93; see also Jonathan D. Glater, U.S. to Widen Inquiry of 
KPMG Tax Shelters, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 7, 2005, at C1. The terms of this continued 
cooperation required KPMG to promptly provide “all documents, records, information 
and [any] other evidence” that the USAO, the IRS, or any other government agency 
designated by the USAO would need for its continued investigation. Stein I, 435 F. 
Supp. 2d at 349. In addition, KPMG agreed not to assert any claim of privilege 
“including, but not limited to the attorney-client privilege and the work product 
protection” in regards to any of the documents, records and other information 
requested by the government. Id. at 349-50. Finally, under the DPA, KPMG agreed 
that even after the dismissal of the Information, which contained the one charge 
against the company in place of a formal indictment, KPMG would “continue to fulfill 
the cooperation obligations set forth” in relation to any investigation, prosecution or 
proceeding (criminal or civil) that arose out of the conduct being investigated. Id. at 
350. 
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the assistance of counsel by hindering KPMG’s advancement of 
attorneys’ fees.98 In addition, the defendants requested that the 
charges against them be dismissed.99 The District Court heard 
the defendants’ challenge and ruled in their favor, holding that 
the conduct of the AUSAs under the Thompson Memo did in 
fact infringe on the defendants’ Sixth Amendment right.100 
III.  OVERVIEW OF THE SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO 
COUNSEL AND ITS APPLICATION IN STEIN 
The Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution 
reads: “In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the 
right to . . . have the assistance of counsel for his defense.”101 
While the assistance of counsel as a right in the United States 
traces its roots at least to the earliest days of the American 
Constitution,102 most of the modern interpretation and 
application of the right to counsel has only taken place in the 
last seventy-five years.103 It is as a result of this modern 
interpretation that the court in Stein expressed the need to 
protect this right of the KPMG defendants.  
A.  The Right to Counsel and the Development of the 
Modern Application 
The right to counsel guaranteed by the Sixth Amend-
ment represents a deviation from the standard practice at the 
time of the American Revolution.104 “Under English law, an 
accused had a right to have counsel in misdemeanor, but not 
  
 98 Stein I, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 350. 
 99 Id.  
 100 Browning, Tactic Questioned, supra note 16. The government’s activity 
“interfered with the ability of the KPMG Defendants to obtain resources they otherwise 
would have had . . . [which] almost certainly will affect what these defendants can 
afford to permit their counsel to do.” Stein I, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 362. This in turn 
infringed on “the rights of such employees to a fair trial and to the effective assistance 
of counsel and therefore violated the Fifth and Sixth Amendments to the Constitution.” 
Id. at 382.  
 101 U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
 102 BEANEY, supra note 31, at 14-15 (stating that there is an ongoing debate 
over the extent of the influence of English common law on the right to counsel as it 
pertains to the pre- and post-Revolutionary period). 
 103 CHEATHAM, supra note 31, at 8-9 (listing Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 
(1932), and Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938), as “the two leading cases that 
established the legal right to counsel” under the U.S. Constitution).  
 104 STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG & DANIEL J. CAPRA, AMERICAN CRIMINAL 
PROCEDURE: CASES AND COMMENTARY 839 (7th ed. 2004).  
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felony, cases.”105 Following the American Revolution, and upon 
adoption of the Constitution, only one of the original thirteen 
states continued to follow this practice.106 The remaining twelve 
states “fully recognized the right to counsel in criminal 
prosecutions.”107 However, the extent to which the individual 
states observed the right to counsel in state prosecutions was 
determined exclusively by state law and therefore could vary 
greatly between states.108 The right to counsel guaranteed 
under the Sixth Amendment also did not immediately apply to 
the states, but rather applied only in federal prosecutions.109  
The modern interpretation of the Sixth Amendment 
right to counsel began in 1932, with the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Powell v. Alabama.110 The Powell Court determined 
that the state of Alabama’s failure to ensure proper counsel for 
defendants in a murder prosecution deprived the defendants of 
their Due Process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment.111 
The Court also outlined the essential protections that the 
assistance of counsel provides defendants:112  
[N]otice and hearing are preliminary steps essential to the passing  
of an enforceable judgment, and . . . constitute basic elements  
of the constitutional requirement of due process of law . . . . 
Historically . . ., in our country at least, [a hearing] has always 
included the right to the aid of counsel when desired and provided by 
the party asserting the right. The right to be heard would be . . . of 
little avail if it did not comprehend the right to be heard by 
counsel.113  
  
 105 Id. While the English Parliament “granted special treatment to those 
accused under the Treason Act of 1695, and required the court to appoint counsel upon 
the request of the accused,” defendants were not permitted to have counsel in ordinary 
felony cases in England until 1836. Id. (citing Faretta v. Cal., 422 U.S. 806, 821-26 
(1975)).  
 106 Id. 
 107 Id. (citing Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 60-64 (1932), where Justice 
Sutherland noted that the new states embraced the right to counsel in their state 
constitutions although the extent of such acceptance did vary from one state to the 
next).  
 108 Id. at 840.  
 109 Id.  
 110 CHEATHAM, supra note 31, at 8; Danton Asher Berube, Drug Proceeds 
Forfeiture and the Right to Counsel of Choice, 43 VAND. L. REV., 1377, 1378 (1990).  
 111 Powell, 287 U.S. at 69.  
 112 Id. However the Court’s decision should not be construed as incorporating 
Sixth Amendment protections to state criminal prosecutions through the Due Process 
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. This was clearly stated by the Supreme Court 
only ten years after Powell in Betts v. Brady. See 316 U.S. 455, 461-62 (1942). 
 113 Powell, 287 U.S. at 69. 
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Notably, the Court detailed the immense complexities of 
the criminal process that make the protection of the right to 
counsel so vital for criminal defendants:  
Even the intelligent and educated layman has small and sometimes 
no skill in the science of law. If charged with a crime, he is 
incapable . . . of determining for himself whether the indictment is 
good or bad. He is unfamiliar with the rules of evidence. Left without 
the aid of counsel, he may be put on trial without a proper charge, 
and convicted upon incompetent evidence . . . . He lacks both the 
skill and knowledge adequately to prepare his defense, even though 
he have a perfect one. He requires . . . counsel at every step in the 
proceedings against him. Without it, though he be not guilty, he 
faces the danger of conviction because he does not know how to 
establish his innocence. If that be true of men of intelligence, how 
much more true is it of the ignorant and illiterate, or those of feeble 
intellect.114  
Since its decision in Powell, the Supreme Court has 
repeatedly asserted that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel 
is designed to guarantee a criminal defendant a fair trial in the 
adversarial criminal process.115 “The Constitution guarantees a 
fair trial through the Due Process Clauses, but it defines the 
basic elements of a fair trial largely through the several 
provisions of the Sixth Amendment, including the Counsel 
Clause.”116 In its cases following Powell, the Court has further 
fleshed out the nature of the rights encompassed by the right to 
counsel. Most notably, in Gideon v. Wainwright, the Court 
ruled that the protections of the right to counsel are a 
“fundamental [safeguard] of liberty immune from federal 
abridgment [and are] equally protected against state invasion 
by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”117 
  
 114 Id. at 68-69. Since Powell, courts have gone to great lengths to ensure that 
proper representation has been provided, even going so far as to force the defendant to 
accept counsel he wished to refuse when the defendant’s ability to represent himself 
was in question. See Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975) (holding that a State 
may not constitutionally force a lawyer upon a criminal defendant who “voluntarily 
and intelligently” chooses to proceed without counsel).  
 115 See, e.g., Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 31 (1972) (“The assistance of 
counsel is often a requisite to the very existence of a fair trial.”); Gideon v. Wainwright, 
372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963) (“The right of one charged with crime to counsel may not be 
deemed fundamental and essential to fair trials in some countries, but it is in ours.”); 
see also Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984); United States v. Morrison, 449 
U.S. 361 (1981).  
 116 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 684-85.  
 117 Gideon, 372 U.S. at 341, 342. This decision also expressly overturned the 
Court’s holding in Betts v. Brady that the Sixth Amendment did not apply to states 
through the incorporation of Fourteenth Amendment Due Process. Id. at 345. See 
supra note 112 and accompanying text.  
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This decision made the appointment of counsel for defendants 
unable to obtain counsel on their own an affirmative obligation 
of both federal and state courts.118 
Since its monumental holding delivered in Gideon, the 
Supreme Court has continued to expound on the extent to 
which the right to counsel applies. The Court’s assessments 
have addressed the right as it pertains to, among other things: 
the different stages of court proceedings at which the right to 
counsel attaches,119 the different types and severity of 
offenses,120 issues of self-representation,121 the requirement of 
effective counsel,122 and defendants’ right to spend their own 
money to obtain their counsel of choice.123  
B.  The Sixth Amendment Protections at Issue in Stein 
While the court in Stein applied this modern interpre-
tation to a number of questions presented before it, for the 
purposes of this Note, only two of these applications— 
the requirement of effective counsel and the defendants’ right 
to spend their own money on counsel of their choice—are of 
significant importance.124  
  
 118 Gideon, 372 U.S. at 340, 344, 345. 
 119 United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967) (holding that certain pre-trial 
proceedings such as suspect line-ups for witness identification are “critical 
confrontations of the accused by the prosecution,” and that the presence of counsel is 
“necessary to ensure a meaningful defense.”). 
 120 Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 33 (1972). This case was critical in its 
interpretation of the right to counsel for two reasons. First, it held that coverage 
applies regardless of a crime’s classification as a felony or misdemeanor and regardless 
of the severity of the punishment for the crime (i.e., fine or imprisonment). Id at 33. 
Second, the Court took special notice of the difficulties that can arise when defendants 
attempt to cooperate with government prosecutors:  
Beyond the problem of trials and appeals is that of the guilty plea, a problem 
which looms large in misdemeanor as well as felony cases. Counsel is needed 
so that the accused may know precisely what he is doing, so that he is fully 
aware of the prospect of going to jail or prison, and so that he is treated fairly 
by the prosecution. 
Id.  
 121 Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. at 807 (holding that even though defendants 
have a right to counsel, and despite the Sixth Amendment’s purpose to ensure a fair 
trial, the State may not force a defendant to accept the assistance of counsel when that 
defendant insists on conducting his own defense); Adams v. United States ex rel. 
McCann, 317 U.S. 269 (1942) (holding that the Constitution does not force a lawyer on 
the individual).  
 122 McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 (1970). 
 123 See Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1, 10 (1983). 
 124 The court in Stein I acknowledged that “[t]he Sixth Amendment attaches 
only upon indictment.” Stein I, 435 F. Supp. 2d 330, 373 (S.D.N.Y 2006). However, as 
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1. The Right to Effective Assistance 
The first application of the Sixth Amendment in Stein I 
was the court’s suggestion that the KPMG defendants were 
deprived of the right to the effective assistance of counsel.125 In 
McMann v. Richardson, the Supreme Court stated unequivo-
cally that the right to counsel means the entitlement to  
“the effective assistance of competent counsel.”126 While this 
entitlement was put forth by the Court as early as its decision 
in Powell,127 it is the Court’s decision in McMann which 
clarified that the Sixth Amendment contained an implicit right 
to effective counsel.128 “[I]f the right to counsel . . . is to serve  
its purpose, defendants cannot be left to the mercies of 
incompetent counsel.”129 
There has been extensive debate both within130 and 
outside131 of the courts regarding what constitutes effective 
versus ineffective assistance of counsel. The Supreme Court 
has addressed claims of ineffective assistance pertaining to 
both the general incompetence of the attorney, as well as 
government interference with the defendant’s efforts to mount 
a defense.132 While the Stein court stressed that the defendants 
were deprived of their rights to counsel “irrespective of the 
  
the court also found that the government’s pre-indictment actions were likely to have 
“an unconstitutional effect upon indictment,” this warranted a finding of attachment of 
Sixth Amendment rights. Id. at 366. Since the court’s decision regarding the 
attachment of the right has no bearing on the purpose of this Note, it does not warrant 
further discussion.  
 125 Stein I, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 382.  
 126 397 U.S. at 771.  
 127 “[S]uch designation of counsel as was attempted was either so indefinite or 
so close upon the trial as to amount to a denial of effective and substantial aid in that 
regard.” Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. at 45, 53 (1932). Having found that the counsel 
for the defendants had made no investigation because no opportunity to do so had been 
given, the Court held that the “defendants were not accorded the right of counsel in 
any substantial sense.” Id. at 58. “[T]he necessity of counsel was so vital and 
imperative that the failure of the trial court to make an effective appointment of 
counsel was likewise a denial of due process . . . .” Id. at 71. 
 128 JOHN M. BURKOFF & NANCY M. BURKOFF, INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF 
COUNSEL, § 1.1 (summarizing the history of the right to effective assistance of counsel).  
 129 McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 (1969).  
 130 See generally Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984); United States 
v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648 (1984); Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335 (1980); Herring v. New 
York, 422 U.S. 853 (1975). 
 131 See BURKOFF & BURKOFF, supra note 128, at § 1:1; see, e.g., Kathleen M. 
Golden, The Sequestration of Criminal Defendants: A Proposal For the Use of Harmless 
Error Analysis in the Aftermath of Geders v. United States, 52 ALB. L. REV. 243, 246 
(1988) (discussing the impact of sequestering criminal defendants during trial on their 
right to effective assistance of counsel).  
 132 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 686. 
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quality of representation they receive” due to the effects of the 
government’s interference, it also hinted at the potential risk of 
incompetent counsel.133 
a. Incompetent Counsel 
The influence of the Thompson Memo and the conduct of 
the AUSAs created a risk of rendering private counsel for the 
KPMG defendants incompetent. In Strickland v. Washington, 
the Supreme Court developed a two-pronged test to evaluate  
a convicted defendant’s claim of defective assistance.134 First, 
there must be a showing of deficient representation by proving 
that counsel made errors so grave that he or she was not 
functioning as counsel within the scope of the Sixth 
Amendment right.135 Second, the defendant must show that  
this deficiency prejudiced his or her defense, depriving that 
defendant of a fair trial.136 The quality of representation by 
the defendant’s counsel must fall “below an objective standard 
of reasonableness.”137 Among the factors to consider in 
determining whether either of these prongs has been met are 
the attorney’s failure to maintain a duty of loyalty to the client 
by avoiding conflicts of interest, failure to advocate the 
defendant’s cause, failure to consult with the defendant on 
important decisions, and failure to keep the defendant 
informed of important developments in the course of the 
prosecution.138 The inquiry looks at the totality of the 
circumstances to determine the reasonableness of counsel’s 
performance.139 
The Supreme Court specifically addressed conflicts of 
interest in Cuyler v. Sullivan.140 In Cuyler, the Court ruled that 
  
 133 Stein I, 435 F. Supp. 2d 330, 369-70, 382 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).  
 134 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. 
 135 Id.; see also infra notes 153-155 and accompanying text. 
 136 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. 
 137 Id. at 688; see also BURKOFF & BURKOFF, supra note 128, at § 1:2 n.4 
(citing critics of Strickland who believe that the test is geared more towards judicial 
efficiency in adjudicating such claims, as opposed to removal of injustices caused by 
incompetent trial counsel).  
 138 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688. 
 139 Id.  
 140 446 U.S. 335 (1980); see also BURKOFF & BURKOFF, supra note 128, ch. 3 
(providing a ranging overview of different factors to be considered by courts hearing 
claims of ineffective counsel due to attorney conflicts of interest, including claims 
raised before and after trial, obligations of trial courts to identify and inquire into 
potential conflicts, and harmonization with ethical standards for attorneys). 
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a defendant is denied the right to effective assistance when 
counsel for the defendant has a conflict of interest which 
prejudices the defense.141 The Court also ruled that a defendant 
is entitled to the same measure of effectiveness when he or she 
employs retained counsel as when counsel is appointed by the 
court: “The vital guarantee of the Sixth Amendment would 
stand for little if the often uninformed decision to retain a 
particular lawyer could reduce or forfeit the defendant’s 
entitlement to constitutional protection.”142  
In Stein I, though ineffectiveness based on a prejudicial 
conflict of interest of retained counsel was not explicitly found, 
the possibility was certainly raised.143 The court analyzed the 
pressure placed by the AUSAs on KPMG to limit its assistance 
in the form of advancing legal fees to its employees: 
[T]he government [did not] question the obvious conflict of interest 
manifest in [counsel for KPMG]’s offer to recommend as counsel to 
targeted KPMG employees “law firms that were familiar with these 
types of proceedings and who understood that cooperation with the 
government was the best way for KPMG to proceed.”144 
The conflict of interest in Stein stemmed from KPMG’s 
conditioning and limiting of fee payment to counsel for its 
targeted employees. This created a risk that attorneys for the 
KPMG employees might not provide full assistance based on 
the perceived need to avoid risking a criminal indictment 
against their clients resulting in the termination of payment of 
their fees and the need to cooperate with the government in 
order not to risk an indictment of the company.145 However, as 
  
 141 Cuyler, 446 U.S. at 350; see also Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. 162, 167-68 
(2002) (distinguishing between conflict of interest cases warranting an automatic 
reversal of any conviction when defense counsel objects to representing divergent 
interests, and cases requiring defendants to establish prejudice to the defense where 
the conflict is not objected to, and the trial court does not know of, nor reasonably 
should know of the conflict, prompting an inquiry). 
 142 Cuyler, 446 U.S. at 344. The Court also held that, despite the private 
relationship between a criminal defendant and his retained counsel, since a state 
criminal proceeding is an action of the state, the mere obtaining of a conviction in a 
trial where the defendant is inadequately represented constitutes the necessary state 
action to give rise to a due process violation. Id. at 343; see also BURKOFF & BURKOFF, 
supra note 128, at § 1:8.  
 143 Stein I, 435 F. Supp. 2d 330, 345 n.54, 370 (S.D.N.Y. 2006). 
 144 Id. at 345 n.54; see also Cuyler, 446 U.S. at 347 (requiring trial courts to 
initiate inquiries into conflicts of interest where the court “knows or reasonably should 
know that a particular conflict exists”). 
 145 Stein I, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 344-46; see also Berube, supra note 110, at 1395 
(discussing similar conflicts of interest arising in criminal cases where defendants’ 
assets, including attorneys’ fees, may be forfeited prior to trial).  
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any risk of ineffective counsel was created by the government’s 
actions and the influence of the Thompson Memo, the Stein 
court did not focus on incompetence of counsel, but rather 
analyzed the case in terms of government interference. In 
addition, for the reasons discussed below, the Stein I court  
did not require a showing of prejudice to the defense. 
Regardless, it is important to highlight how a conflict of 
interest risks rendering defense counsel incompetent as a 
potential byproduct of excessive government scrutiny over how 
white collar defendants retain and pay for their representation. 
b. Claims of Ineffective Assistance Based on 
Government Interference 
Government interference with the ability of counsel to 
make “independent decisions about how to conduct the defense” 
also constitutes a violation of a criminal defendant’s right to 
the effective assistance of counsel.146  
More specifically, the right to the assistance of counsel has been 
understood to mean that there can be no restrictions upon the 
function of counsel in defending a criminal prosecution in accord 
with the traditions of the adversary fact-finding process that has 
been constitutionalized in the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments.147 
Examples of government interference that have been found to 
render counsel’s assistance ineffective include state statutes 
permitting judges the discretion to bar closing summations in 
non-jury trials,148 court orders denying defendants the right to 
speak with their counsel,149 state rules requiring a defendant to 
testify first or not at all,150 and state rules declaring defendants 
unfit to testify under oath at trial on their own behalf.151  
  
 146 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984).  
 147 Herring v. New York, 422 U.S. 853, 857 (1975).  
 148 Id. at 864 (discussing the different arguments that the defendant’s 
attorney might have made during closing arguments, potentially altering the ultimate 
judgment rendered in the case). 
 149 Geders v. United States, 425 U.S. 80, 88 (1975) (discussing the importance 
of allowing defense counsel to speak with the defendant during an overnight recess in a 
criminal trial due to “tactical decisions to be made and strategies to be reviewed”). 
 150 Brooks v. Tennessee, 406 U.S. 605, 612-13 (1972) (“By requiring the 
accused and his lawyer to make [the choice to testify first or not at all] without an 
opportunity to evaluate the actual worth of their evidence, the statute restricts the 
defense—particularly counsel—in the planning of the case.”). 
 151 Ferguson v. Georgia, 365 U.S. 570, 592-94, 596 (1961) (holding that 
allowing a defendant to make only an unsworn statement during trial and preventing 
defense counsel from conducting a direct examination of the defendant denied the 
defendant of his rights to counsel and due process).  
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In Stein I, the court found a violation of the defendants’ 
right to counsel based on the Thompson Memo and the AUSAs’ 
scrutiny of KPMG’s fee advancement policy. The court held 
that the government obstructed the employees’ access to a valid 
source of funding for their legal defense and therefore 
improperly intruded on the manner in which the individual 
employees wished to defend themselves.152 In arriving at its 
holding, the court took notice of the immense amount of time, 
document review, and complexity involved in the preparation of 
what the court recognized was at least one of the “largest tax 
fraud case[s] in United States history.”153 This also warranted 
consideration of the vast amount of money that would be 
needed in order for the defendants to mount the defense they 
desired.154 The court in Stein I and again in Stein III 
highlighted the potential risks ensuing from such an 
obstruction, pointing out that “[a]t least most of [the 
defendants] likely will be unable to afford to pay their 
attorneys to review all or even most of the documents the 
government has produced or . . . to interview even a fraction of 
the witnesses the government has interviewed.”155 The court in 
  
 152 Stein I, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 362. “The government here acted with the 
purpose of minimizing these defendants’ access to resources necessary to mount their 
defenses or, at least, in reckless disregard that this would be the likely result of its 
actions. In these circumstances, it is not unfair to hold it accountable.” Id. at 366-67.  
 153 Id. at 362; see also Lynnley Browning, Judge Delays KPMG Tax Trial Over 
Legal Fees Dispute, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 15, 2006, at C3. In its decision in Stein III, the 
court again raised this issue, pointing out the significant increases in the amount of 
documentation produced since its decision in Stein I, obstacles arising in accessing the 
documents, numerous motions raised over the course of the investigation, and the 
expected length of the trial. Stein III, 495 F. Supp. 2d 390, 417-18 (S.D.N.Y. 2007).  
 154 Stein I, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 362 n.163, 371; Stein III, 495 F. Supp. 2d at 
423-24. 
 155 Stein I, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 371; see also Stein III, 495 F. Supp. 2d at 423 
(stating that the relatively small net worth of some of the defendants in the case, 
compared with the large amounts already owed to their attorneys, illustrates that 
“[n]one of them can afford to defend this case at any meaningful level”). These 
considerations seem to indicate concern on the part of the Stein court that the 
defendants might not be effectively represented within the minimum requirements of 
the Sixth Amendment, discussed supra Part III.B.1.a, due to the need for counsel to 
make “strategic choices . . . after thorough investigation of law and facts.” Strickland, 
466 U.S. at 690. However, two determinations by the court in Stein I and III remove 
this point from consideration. First, the Stein I court found that the defendants were 
deprived of their rights to counsel “irrespective of the quality of representation they 
receive[d].” Stein I, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 369. Second, the Stein III court recognized that 
appointed counsel, which would statutorily receive dramatically lower fees and would 
likely be more restricted in its ability to investigate, could still potentially “provide the 
minimally effective defense” required by the Constitution. Stein III, 495 F. Supp. 2d at 
421. Therefore, this particular Sixth Amendment concern does not warrant speculation 
in this Note.  
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Stein I also addressed the costs of tax experts that would likely 
be needed to rebut expert testimony presented by the 
government.156 
However, the KPMG defendants were not required to 
prove that their defense had been prejudiced, as is customary 
for a finding of ineffective assistance of counsel.157 The Stein I 
court ruled that the government’s conduct that interfered with 
the defendants’ right “to be represented as they choose” 
constituted a complete deprivation of their right to counsel 
without it hinging on the quality of the representation they 
received.158 Thus, before any criminal trial could even begin, the 
court had to determine whether corrective action could allow 
the defendants to defend themselves as they had wished, 
guaranteeing them their right to a fair trial.159 
Additionally, prejudice is not required where the 
governmental interference is severe enough that it creates  
an overarching structural defect in a defendant’s trial.160 Such  
a defect could prohibit even fully competent counsel from 
providing effective assistance,161 and would warrant a presump-
tion of prejudice against the defendant.162 In Stein I, the court 
found that such a defect existed in violation of the defendants’ 
right to counsel as a direct result of the Thompson Memo and 
the actions of the AUSAs.163 The court expressly held that the 
government’s obstruction of the defendants’ access to funds 
created a very high risk of contaminating the entire proceeding 
and that due to the immense amount of documentation 
involved, the substantial time and cost expended, and the 
complexity of the case, it would be impossible to know whether 
the defendants could have altered the outcome absent the 
limitations imposed by the government.164 Thus, a presumption 
of prejudice was warranted without need to review specific 
  
 156 Stein I, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 371.  
 157 Id. at 369.  
 158 Id.  
 159 Id. 
 160 See United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 126 S. Ct. 2557, 2564-65 (2006) 
(citing Arizona v. Fulimante, 499 U.S. 279, 306-10 (1991)) (dividing constitutional 
errors into “trial errors,” which occur during presentation of the case to the jury and 
are subject to harmless-error review, and “structural defects,” which affect the 
framework of the entire trial). 
 161 Gonzalez-Lopez, 126 S. Ct. at 2563-64. 
 162 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 692 (1984). 
 163 Stein I, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 371. 
 164 Id. at 371-72. 
1140 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 73:3 
details of any ensuing trial.165 This entitled the defendant 
employees to relief to the extent that “the Thompson 
Memorandum and the activities of the USAO . . . interfered 
with the rights of such employees to a fair trial and to the 
effective assistance of counsel.”166 
2.  The Defendants’ Right to Spend Their Own Money  
on Counsel of Their Choice 
The second application of the right to counsel in the 
Stein cases is the district court’s holding in Stein III that the 
defendants were improperly deprived of their right to counsel 
of their choice.167 The right of defendants to obtain the counsel 
of their choice is another application of the Sixth Amendment 
right to counsel that has been recognized since Powell.168 
However, the extent to which a defendant may choose his or 
her own counsel has been circumscribed by the restriction that 
the defendant be able to afford that counsel.169 This limitation 
was made clear by the Supreme Court in Morris v. Slappy.170 
In Morris, the Court was presented with an indigent 
defendant who was represented by an appointed attorney, 
which the trial court had replaced due to illness.171 The 
defendant argued for a continuance, over the objections of his 
  
 165 However, the Supreme Court has also held that the mere need to review 
large amounts of documentation, complexity of the case, and time constraints in 
preparing an adequate defense do not give rise to an automatic finding of ineffective 
representation by counsel. See United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 652-53 (1984) 
(holding that representation of a criminal defendant by an appointed attorney who  
had only twenty-five days to prepare a defense in a fraud case involving review of 
thousands of documents, and where the government had over four and a half years to 
investigate and prepare, does not create an automatic presumption of ineffectiveness). 
This would still require the accused to show specific errors made by his counsel that 
“undermined the reliability of the finding of guilt,” Id. at 659 n.26, without which 
reversal would be required even when counsel’s actual representation was flawless. Id. 
at 653. However such factors are relevant considerations in determining whether 
counsel made errors prejudicial to the defendant in his particular case and the extent 
to which those errors and prejudice rendered counsel ineffective. Id. at 663; see also 
United States v. Cronic, 839 F.2d 1401, 1402-04 (10th Cir. 1988) (finding, on remand 
from the Supreme Court, that errors made by counsel during trial due to inadequate 
preparation time and counsel’s inexperience caused prejudicial error to the defendant 
warranting a finding of ineffectiveness). 
 166 Stein I, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 382. 
 167 Stein III, 495 F. Supp. 2d 390, 415 (S.D.N.Y. 2007).  
 168 Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 52 (1932) (“It is hardly necessary to say 
that the right to counsel being conceded, a defendant should be afforded a fair 
opportunity to secure counsel of his own choice.”).  
 169 See Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1, 11-15 (1983).  
 170 Id.  
 171 Id. at 5. 
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second attorney, claiming that his new counsel did not have 
enough time to prepare an adequate defense.172 The trial court 
denied the defendant’s motion, and the defendant was sub-
sequently convicted.173 On appeal, the Circuit Court found that 
defendant’s Sixth Amendment right was violated due to the 
absence of a “meaningful attorney-client relationship” with his 
appointed counsel.174 The Supreme Court rejected the ruling by 
the Circuit Court, holding that where a defendant is unable to 
afford counsel of his choice, the Sixth Amendment does not 
require the defendant have a meaningful relationship with his 
appointed counsel.175  
Even when a defendant has sufficient assets to retain 
counsel of his choosing, further limitations on the guarantee 
may apply. In Wheat v. United States,176 the Supreme Court 
evaluated a potential conflict of interest when the defendant’s 
desired counsel was disqualified by the trial court due to 
already representing other defendants charged in the same 
conspiracy.177 The attorney had already been involved in 
substantial contact with the prosecution, and the government 
was concerned that if one of the other defendants were to 
testify against the petitioner, the attorney would fail in his 
responsibility to provide effective counsel.178 The Court ruled 
that the trial court did not err in its disqualification of the 
defendant’s counsel of choice and the defendant’s conviction 
was upheld.179 The court made it clear that 
[t]he Sixth Amendment right to choose one’s own counsel is 
circumscribed in several important respects. . . . [A] defendant may 
not insist on representation by an attorney he cannot afford, or who 
for other reasons declines to represent the defendant. Nor may a 
defendant insist on the counsel of an attorney who has a previous or 
  
 172 Id. at 6.  
 173 Id. at 6-7, 9. 
 174 Id. at 10.  
 175 Id. at 13 (“No court could possibly guarantee that a defendant will develop 
the kind of rapport with his attorney—privately retained or provided by the public—
that the Court of Appeals thought part of the Sixth Amendment guarantee of counsel.”).  
 176 486 U.S. 153 (1988). 
 177 Id. at 157.  
 178 Id. at 155.  
 179 Id. The Court also weighed the risk of government abuse in manufacturing 
conflicts to prevent defendants from being represented by “able defense counsel,” but 
chose to rely on trial courts being aware of such a tactic. Id. at 163. 
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ongoing relationship with an opposing party, even when the 
opposing party is the Government.180  
Where a defendant is wrongfully denied his counsel of 
choice, such a deprivation is also a complete violation of the 
Sixth Amendment right to counsel, and a defendant might not 
be required to show prejudice to his defense.181 In United States 
v. Gonzalez-Lopez, the Supreme Court stated that “the right to 
select counsel of one’s choice . . . has never been derived from 
the Sixth Amendment’s purpose of ensuring a fair trial,” but 
rather is “regarded as the root meaning of the constitutional 
guarantee.”182 Thus, erroneous deprivations of counsel of choice 
may constitute structural errors which pervade the entire trial, 
removing any requirement to show prejudice. 
To determine the effect of wrongful denial of choice of counsel [is not 
to look] for mistakes committed by the actual counsel, but for 
differences in the defense that would have been made by the rejected 
counsel . . . . We would have to speculate upon what matters the 
rejected counsel would have handled differently . . . . [a]nd then  
we would have to speculate upon what effect those different choices 
had or different intangibles might have had. The difficulties of 
conducting [assessments of prejudice for wrongful denial of counsel 
of choice and ineffective assistance of counsel] are not remotely 
comparable.183 
The court’s holding in Stein III came after it noted that 
at least some of the defendants had retained multiple counsel 
prior to being indicted but were forced to terminate some of 
their counsel when KPMG cut off payments for their legal 
fees.184 However, the right to counsel of choice was implicated 
even prior to the district court’s affirmative holding in Stein III 
  
 180 Wheat, 486 U.S. at 159. “The right to counsel of choice . . . is not absolute. 
When a defendant’s selection of counsel, under the particular . . . circumstances of a 
case, gravely imperils the prospect of a fair trial, a court may justifiably refuse to 
accede to the choice. Thus a trial court may in certain situations reject a defendant’s 
choice of counsel on the ground of a potential conflict of interest, because a serious 
conflict may indeed destroy the integrity of the trial process.” Id. at 166 (Marshall, J., 
dissenting); see also Lainfiesta v. Artuz, 253 F.3d 151, 154 (2d Cir. 2001) (stating that 
the right may be overcome if it is “outweighed by competing interests in the fair 
administration of justice or maintaining orderly trial procedures”). 
 181 United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 126 S. Ct. 2557, 2562 (2006).  
 182 Id. at 2563. 
 183 Id. at 2565. But see also Lainfiesta, 253 F.3d at 157 (holding, where a trial 
court limited cross-examination of witnesses to only one of defendant’s two attorneys, 
that such a denial may not warrant automatic reversal since it does not constitute an 
“[a]ctual or constructive denial of the assistance of counsel altogether” (internal 
quotation marks omitted)). 
 184 Stein III, 495 F. Supp. 2d 390, 415 (S.D.N.Y. 2007).  
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when the Stein I court dismissed the government’s claim that 
the Sixth Amendment did not entitle the KPMG defendants to 
spend “‘other people’s money’ on expensive defense counsel.”185 
The linchpin of the government’s argument against protection 
of the individual defendants’ use of other people’s money186—in 
this case KPMG’s—was the Supreme Court’s decisions in 
Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States,187 and United 
States v. Monsanto.188 In Caplin and Monsanto, the Court 
addressed whether a federal statute allowing the government 
to seek a restraining order prohibiting the transfer of a 
defendant’s assets that were potentially forfeitable to the 
government as fruits of a violation of federal drug laws 
infringed on that defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to 
counsel of his choice.189 The Court held both in Caplin and 
Monsanto that no Sixth Amendment violation occurred since 
the statute only prohibited the use of forfeitable assets to 
obtain one’s counsel of choice.190 
Nevertheless, the Stein I court rejected the govern-
ment’s reliance on these cases as relevant precedent for such 
an argument.191 First, the court pointed out that Caplin and 
Monsanto dealt with a defendant who sought to spend money 
that, being forfeitable under federal law, belonged to the 
government.192 Second, it interpreted Caplin as standing for the 
  
 185 Stein I, 435 F. Supp. 2d 330, 367 (S.D.N.Y. 2006). 
 186 Id.; see also Bloomberg News, supra note 60 (reporting on the federal 
prosecutors argument that “[t]he constitution only guarantees defendants the right to a 
lawyer, ‘not the best lawyer money can buy or a particular lawyer’”). 
 187 491 U.S. 617 (1989).  
 188 491 U.S. 600 (1989).  
 189 Caplin, 491 U.S. at 623-24; Monsanto, 491 U.S. at 614. 
 190 Caplin, 491 U.S. at 625. “A defendant has no Sixth Amendment right to 
spend another person’s money for services rendered by an attorney, even if those funds 
are the only way that that defendant will be able to retain the attorney of his 
choice . . . . [when t]he money, though in his possession, is not rightfully his . . . .” Id. at 
626. Caplin and Monsanto were companion cases that were handed down by the 
Supreme Court on the same day. Consequently, the Court relied on its decision in 
Caplin to answer the same question in Monsanto. Monsanto, 491 U.S. at 614. 
 191 Stein I, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 367.  
 192 Id. at 367. In Caplin, the Supreme Court also compared defendant’s use of 
funds obtained through federal drug violations for payment of legal fees to that of a 
defendant wishing to use the proceeds of a bank robbery for the same purpose. 491 U.S. 
at 626. However the comparison between the government’s interest in forfeited assets 
due to a drug transaction, and its interest in assets resulting from a bank robbery has 
been criticized by commentators. See Bruce J. Winick, Forfeiture of Attorneys’ Fees 
Under RICO and CCE and the Right to Counsel of Choice: The Constitutional Dilemma 
and How to Avoid It, 43 U. MIAMI L. REV. 765, 814 (1989) (claiming that the bank 
analogy fails because the assets are the rightful property of the bank, and must be 
returned). However, the purpose of the analogy in Caplin was to show that whether the 
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proposition that the Sixth Amendment protects “a defendant’s 
right to spend his own money on a defense”193 and that the 
expectation of the KPMG employees that KPMG would cover 
their legal expenses arising out of any claims or charges based 
on their service with the firm was a property right that could 
not be interfered with by the government.194 The court went on 
to hold in Stein III that even though many of these defendants 
still retained their own counsel for their defense after KPMG 
had cut off legal fees, the right to counsel of choice “includes 
the right to a second lawyer or law firm if the defendant can 
afford it, either from his own resources or from those lawfully 
available to him from others.”195 
C.  The Remedy Granted to the KPMG Defendants for 
Violation of Their Constitutional Rights and Its  
Impact on the Prosecution 
After determining that the KPMG defendants’ Sixth 
Amendment rights had been violated, the court in Stein I and 
Stein III considered the appropriate remedy. In Stein I,  
the court did not grant the defendants’ motion to dismiss  
the indictments against the employees.196 Rather, it gave the 
defendants limited relief “tailored narrowly to the injury 
suffered”197 by suppressing certain statements made by the 
defendants that the government obtained as a result of its 
constitutional violations.198 However, the court did reserve  
the ability to make a decision regarding “whether to grant 
additional relief,”199 including the option to dismiss the 
indictments at a later time.200  
  
forfeitable assets are obtained by the defendant from a legally possessing third party 
(i.e., the bank), or obtained by the defendant without intruding on a legitimate third 
party claim (i.e., in drug cases), the fact that the assets are “tainted” by the illegal 
acquisition is what vests the government with its property interest through forfeiture. 
Caplin, 491 U.S. at 627.  
 193 Stein I, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 367.  
 194 Id.  
 195 Stein III, 495 F. Supp. 2d at 422. 
 196 Browning, Tactic Questioned, supra note 16.  
 197 Stein I, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 374.  
 198 Stein III, 440 F. Supp. 2d 315, 338 (S.D.N.Y. 2006). 
 199 Stein I, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 382. 
 200 See Lynnley Browning, Judge Raises New Concerns About Tactics In 
Shelter Case, N.Y. TIMES, July, 14, 2006, at C3 [hereinafter Browning, Judge Raises] 
(reporting that one month after Stein I the judge suggested “he might consider 
postponing the trial or even dismissing the case”). 
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In Stein III, the court reexamined appropriate relief for 
the defendants after it was unable to force the government to 
reimburse the legal fees to the individual defendants as a 
result of the government’s sovereign immunity protection.201 In 
addition, the defendant’s efforts to seek civil action against 
KPMG to have their legal fees paid failed for lack of 
jurisdiction.202 As a result, the court (albeit “with the greatest 
reluctance”) dismissed the indictments of thirteen employee 
defendants whose rights were violated due to KPMG’s dis-
continuing the payment of legal fees.203 However, it denied 
dismissal to the remaining three defendants who were former 
employees of the firm and who had not shown that KPMG 
would have paid their defense costs “as a matter of either grace 
or obligation.”204 In spite of this and as a result of its 
overreaching, the government lost the opportunity to prosecute 
many of the suspected individuals for their alleged criminal 
misconduct. 
IV.  THE DISTRICT COURT’S FACTUAL FINDINGS IN STEIN  
AND ITS WEAKNESSES 
Before concluding that the government intruded on the 
Sixth Amendment right to counsel of the defendant employees, 
the Stein court arrived at a number of factual conclusions in 
order to ascertain whether the Sixth Amendment was even 
implicated. First, the court determined that KPMG would have 
advanced legal fees to its employees.205 This conclusion was 
based partly on a state statute giving KPMG the option (but 
not necessarily the obligation) to indemnify its employees 
through means which include the advancement of legal fees206 
as well as on evidence showing that KPMG had a history of 
  
 201 Stein I, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 376. 
 202 The court in Stein I had originally held that it had the requisite 
jurisdiction over the defendants’ claims against KPMG for reimbursement and 
advancement of their legal fees. Stein I, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 379. However, this ruling 
was overturned by the Second Circuit on appeal. See Stein v. KPMG, LLP, 486 F.3d 
753, 756 (2d Cir. 2007). 
 203 Stein III, 495 F. Supp. 2d at 423, 427. 
 204 Id. at 426-27.  
 205 Stein I, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 353; Stein III, 495 F. Supp. 2d at 405.  
 206 Stein I, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 355 n.117 (citing the Delaware Revised Uniform 
Partnership Act, DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 15-110 (providing that, subject to the 
partnership agreement, “a partnership may, and shall have the power to, indemnify 
and hold harmless any partner or other person from and against any and all claims 
and demands whatsoever”)). 
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doing so.207 This finding was bolstered in Stein III by additional 
evidence that the court felt revealed KPMG’s true desire to 
cover litigation expenses for the indicted defendants.208 This 
included the voicemail message from KPMG to its partners 
offering to pay for counsel for any current or former members 
of the firm involved in the investigation, the severance 
agreement negotiated with Richard Smith that KPMG refused 
to sign after it sensed the pressure from the AUSAs, and notes 
taken by counsel for KPMG from the firm’s initial meeting with 
the USAO.209  
Next, the court concluded that the threat of an 
indictment based on the guidelines in the Thompson Memo and 
the pressure applied on KPMG by the AUSAs during the 
course of the investigation caused the company to “consider 
departing from its long-standing policy of paying legal fees and 
expenses.”210 However in arriving at these conclusions, the 
court was forced to make a number of circumstantial inferences 
that illuminate the difficulties faced in making constitutional 
determinations regarding the advancement of legal fees and 
that illustrate the weaknesses of the Stein court’s decisions.  
A.  The Court’s Holdings Regarding Indemnification and 
Advancement 
In assessing what legal obligation KPMG had to 
advance legal fees to its employees, the Stein I court first 
looked at whether the company was subject to state 
indemnification laws.211 Aware that all states have laws 
addressing company indemnification of employees and that 
these laws differ in terms of whether indemnification is 
  
 207 As the Stein court wrote: 
KPMG had an unbroken track record of paying the legal expenses of its 
partners and employees incurred as a result of their jobs, without regard to 
cost. All of the . . . defendants therefore had, at a minimum, every reason to 
expect that KPMG would pay their legal expenses in connection with the 
government’s investigation and, if they were indicted, defending against any 
charges that arose out of their employment by KPMG. 
Stein I, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 355-56; see also Stein III, 495 F. Supp. 2d at 402, 406.  
 208 Stein III, 495 F. Supp. 2d at 407.  
 209 Id. at 407-08.  
 210 Stein I, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 352 (also determining that KPMG had 
considered departing from its practice of advancing fees, even before any conversations 
with the AUSAs took place, based merely on the inherent threat of indictment posed in 
the Thompson Memo); Stein III, 495 F. Supp. 2d at 400. 
 211 Stein I, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 354. 
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permissive or required, the court had to determine what 
statutory obligations attached to KPMG.212 The court 
recognized that these statutes differ not just between states 
but also between different types of business entities within  
the same state.213 Since KPMG is a Delaware company, the 
court applied the indemnification laws of the state of 
Delaware.214 Next, since KPMG was formed as a limited 
liability partnership, the court distinguished between the 
indemnification statutes governing Delaware corporations215 
and statutes governing Delaware partnerships.216 Finally, the 
court noted that the law governing individual defendants may 
change when an individual is an employee rather than a 
partner in the firm and works in a different state.217  
This analysis illustrates three issues courts must 
consider in evaluating a company’s statutory obligation to 
indemnify its employees. First, the court must identify the  
type of business entity employing the person subject to the 
litigation and whether it is covered under a state’s indemnifi-
  
 212 Id. at 354-55 (citing 3A WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER ET AL., FLETCHER 
CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 1344.10 (2002)).  
 213 Id. at 354. While indemnification laws vary between states, this Note will 
focus on Delaware’s indemnification law, both for simplicity as well as due to KPMG’s 
status as a Delaware Limited Liability Partnership.  
 214 Id. at 355 n.117.  
 215 Delaware law provides:  
A corporation shall have power to indemnify any person who was or is a party 
or is threatened to be made a party to any . . . pending or completed action, 
suit or proceeding, whether civil, criminal, administrative or investiga-
tive . . . by reason of the fact that the person is or was a director, officer, 
employee or agent of the corporation . . . against expenses (including 
attorneys’ fees), judgments, fines and amounts paid in settlement actually 
and reasonably incurred by the person in connection with such action, suit or 
proceeding if the person acted in good faith and in a manner the person 
reasonably believed to be in . . . the best interests of the corporation, and, 
with respect to any criminal action or proceeding, had no reasonable cause to 
believe the person’s conduct was unlawful. 
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145(a) (2006). Section 145(b) continues: 
[N]o indemnification shall be made in respect of any claim . . . as to which 
such person shall have been adjudged to be liable to the corporation 
unless . . . the court . . . shall determine upon application that, despite the 
adjudication of liability but in view of all the circumstances of the case, such 
person is fairly and reasonably entitled to indemnity for such expenses which 
the Court . . . shall deem proper. 
Id. § 145(b). 
 216 Id. tit. 6, § 15-110; Stein I, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 355 n.117. 
 217 See Stein I, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 356 n.119 (discussing KPMG defendants 
who were entitled to mandatory indemnification under California law). 
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cation law.218 Second, the court must then ascertain what 
classes of employees within the company (that is, officers, 
directors, partners, employees, etc.) are intended to be covered 
by the indemnification statute in question and whether a 
specific employee falls within that class. Finally, depending on 
those first two factors, the court must be sure that it is 
applying the indemnification statute of the proper state. This 
analysis becomes even more confusing when one realizes that, 
as in Stein, the state statute may permit indemnification but 
not require it.219  
The Stein I court noted that the Delaware indemni-
fication law is subject to any “standards and restrictions” set 
out in KPMG’s partnership agreement.220 The court inferred 
that since KPMG’s agreement contained no such restrictions, 
rendering it “entirely free to indemnify its personnel,” KPMG 
would have necessarily done so.221 However, this argument also 
cuts the other way. KPMG’s statutory freedom to indemnify its 
personnel does not necessarily create an obligation to do so.222 
Depending on the state whose indemnification law is applied, 
the statutory requirements, and the type of company in 
question, a showing of good faith by the individual being 
investigated may be required before he or she might be eligible 
for indemnification.223  
  
 218 As a general example, the law in the state of Delaware governing 
companies set up as corporations does not govern companies set up as limited liability 
partnerships. See DEL. CODE ANN., tit. 8, § 145(a) (establishing permissive indem-
nification for Delaware corporations); id., tit. 6., § 15-110 (establishing permissive 
indemnification for Delaware partnerships). 
 219 See Kurt A. Mayr, II, Note, Indemnification of Directors and Officers: The 
Double Whammy of Mandatory Indemnification Under Delaware Law in Walutch v. 
Conticommodity Services, Inc., 42 VILL. L. REV. 223, 223-24 (1997) (noting that, in 
response to concerns regarding director and officer personal liability, states enacted 
statutes to limit director and officer exposure through “indemnification statutes that 
empower corporations to indemnify their directors and officers . . . and, in some 
instances, requiring such indemnification” (emphasis added)).  
 220 Stein I, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 355 n.117 (quoting DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6,  
§ 15-110)). 
 221 Id. 
 222 Sr. Tour Players 207 Mgmt. Co. v. Golftown 207 Holding Co., 853 A.2d 124, 
127 n.5 (Del. Ch. 2004) (comparing the nearly identical language under Delaware 
limited liability company and limited partnership law, and stating that “[t]he statutory 
language is permissive and does not per se create a right to indemnification”). 
 223 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145(a) (requiring that the person seeking 
indemnification act “in good faith and in a manner the person reasonably believed to be 
in or not opposed to the best interests of the corporation, and, with respect to any 
criminal action or proceeding, had no reasonable cause to believe the person’s conduct 
was unlawful”); Julie J. Bisceglia, Practical Aspects of Directors’ and Officers’ Liability 
Insurance—Allocating and Advancing Legal Fees and the Duty to Defend, 32 UCLA L. 
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This exposes a weakness in the Stein court’s presump-
tion that, absent the presence of the Thompson Memo, KPMG 
would have paid the defense costs for its partners and 
employees simply because it had the discretion to do so. With 
nothing in KPMG’s partnership agreement making any 
mention of indemnification,224 it is entirely possible that KPMG, 
or any company subject to government investigation, may 
choose to inquire as to whether an employee, partner, officer or 
director’s acts were in good faith and perceived as lawful before 
determining eligibility for indemnification.225 Additionally, as 
noted by the Stein I court, virtually all indemnification laws 
have one common characteristic: the right to indemnification is 
contingent on the defense to the legal proceedings being 
successful on the merits.226 Therefore, any obligation KPMG 
had to indemnify would not exist if the individual defendants 
were found guilty of the charges. 
  
REV. 690, 696-97 (1985) (discussing how states have followed Delaware, permitting 
indemnification for expenses, fines, and judgment and settlement costs where the 
defendant acts in good faith and, in criminal actions, has no reasonable cause to believe 
his conduct is illegal); see also J. WILLIAM CALLISON & MAUREEN A. SULLIVAN, 
PARTNERSHIP LAW AND PRACTICE: GENERAL AND LIMITED PARTNERSHIPS § 10:6 (2007) 
(stating that a requirement of good faith may be set as a standard for indemnification); 
Sr. Tour Players, 853 A.2d at 128 (interpreting the operating agreement of a limited 
liability company which expressly denied indemnification for actions involving bad 
faith).  
 224 Stein I, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 340. 
 225 Indeed, it appears that even in KPMG’s case, an argument that good faith 
and perception of lawful conduct were absent could be made. See Weil, supra note 93, 
at C1 (reporting that one former partner who was indicted testified before the Senate 
Subcommittee regarding “his attempts to dissuade senior partners from approving one 
of the four shelters in question. . . . Emails showed he cautioned other KPMG partners 
that the strategy wasn’t legitimate”). This argument may be advanced even further by 
considering that KPMG’s decision to terminate the employment of some of its senior 
partners, see supra Part II.B, came even before its initial discussions with USAO. 
Stein I, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 339.  
 226 Stein I, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 355 (citing Homestore Inc. v. Tafeen, 888 A.2d 
204, 211 (Del. 2005) as stating that while Delaware’s law “allows corporate officials to 
defend themselves in legal proceedings ‘secure in the knowledge that, if vindicated, the 
corporation will bear the expense of litigation[,]’ . . . indemnification cannot be 
established until after the defense to legal proceedings has been ‘successful on the 
merits or otherwise’” (footnotes omitted)); see also DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145(c) (“To 
the extent that a . . . director or officer of a corporation has been successful on the 
merits . . . in defense of any action . . ., such person shall be indemnified against 
expenses (including attorneys’ fees) actually and reasonably incurred . . . .”); CALLISON 
& SULLIVAN, supra note 223 (suggesting “success on the merits” as a “method for 
determining whether the standard for indemnification has been met” in the creation of 
a partnership agreement); Majkowski v. Am. Imaging Mgmt. Servs., LLC, 913 A.2d 
572, 586 (Del. Ch. 2006) (“[A]n indemnification dispute cannot be resolved until after 
the merits of the underlying controversy are decided because the good faith standard 
requires a factual inquiry in the events that gave rise to the lawsuit.”).  
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Even assuming that indemnification does apply and 
that the defense can succeed on the merits, individual 
defendants in these types of criminal proceedings, without 
more, might still be faced with the extreme difficulty of 
covering the cost of the litigation.227 This exposes the 
defendants to “the personal out-of-pocket financial burden of 
paying the significant on-going expenses inevitably involved 
with investigations and legal proceedings.”228 At least in part 
out of these concerns, indemnification statutes generally allow 
for the advancement of legal fees before the conclusion of the 
case.229 One rationale for this is that advancement is needed as 
an inducement to attract the most capable individuals to 
positions of high responsibility in companies.230  
However, a major drawback to indemnification statutes 
that allow for the advancement of legal fees is that such 
advances are entirely permissive.231 A company may advance 
legal expenses in defense of litigation to its officers, directors, 
partners or employees, but may also choose not to provide for 
advancement at all, or to limit situations in which it would do 
so.232 One significant limitation is that defendants seeking 
advancement of legal fees prior to the final disposition of a 
proceeding may be required to deliver a written undertaking to 
repay any funds advanced if it is determined that they are not 
entitled to indemnification by the company.233  
  
 227 Stein I, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 355. “The cost of a trial is out of the financial 
reach of many white-collar defendants. ‘It is hard to defend a white-collar case for less 
than $100,000, and most cost much, much more than that.’” Koppel, supra note 42 
(quoting a Georgetown University McDonough School of Business professor).  
 228 Homestore, 888 A.2d at 211.  
 229 18B AM. JUR. 2D Corporations § 1651 (2004); see also John J. Falvey, Jr. & 
Janet E. Taylor, Federal Prosecutors and Advancement of Legal Defense Fees: Don’t 
Ask, Don’t Tell, BOSTON BAR J., Jan./Feb. 2008, at 14.  
 230 Homestore, 888 A.2d at 211; Falvey & Taylor, supra note 229, at 14 
(arguing that advancement allows directors to act in the best interests of the 
corporation while knowing that they can resist meritless suits and not be forced to fund 
their own legal defense).  
 231 18B AM. JUR. 2D Corporations § 1651; Bisceglia, supra note 223, at 709-10. 
 232 18B AM. JUR. 2D Corporations § 1651. 
 233 3A WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER ET AL., FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW 
OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS §1344.10 (perm. ed., rev. vol. 2002) (discussing statutory 
indemnification and advancement in the context of corporations); DEL. CODE. ANN. Tit. 
8, § 145(e) (requiring an officer or director to deliver an undertaking to repay legal fees 
where a corporation chooses to advance); see also Sr. Tour Players, 853 A.2d at 127 n.5, 
129 (discussing the “broad authority” given to limited liability companies and limited 
partnerships under Delaware law to set their indemnification provisions and “to 
require a written undertaking as a condition to advancement”). 
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Thus, while indemnification and advancement may be 
correlative, they are “separate and distinct legal actions. [A 
defendant’s] right to advancement is not dependent on [his or 
her] right to indemnification.”234 
[A] corporation may, through its certificate of incorporation or 
bylaws, or in a contract specifically addressing the issue, make 
mandatory the advancement of expenses to a director or former 
director for defending in a covered proceeding. Such a provision may 
be enforced as a contract. However, if the applicable corporate 
indemnification statute is permissive, then a provision in a 
corporation’s bylaws requiring the corporation to indemnify its 
directors, officers, employees, and agents to the extent permitted by 
law is not mandatory and does not require the corporation to 
advance litigation expenses before the termination of the proceeding 
in which the expenses were incurred.235 
This presents another issue that courts must address: 
determining what, if any, provisions regarding indemnification 
and advancement exist in a company’s bylaws or partnership 
agreement, or in other express contractual agreements, and 
then whether any such provision entitles a particular employee 
to advancement.236 If a company has no expressly stated 
provisions regarding indemnification and advancement in its 
corporate bylaws or partnership agreement, this becomes 
substantially more difficult.237  
As this was the case for KPMG in Stein, the court 
overcame this difficulty in two ways. First, the court found that 
  
 234 Homestore, 888 A.2d at 212; accord Sr. Tour Players, 853 A.2d at 128.  
 235 18B AM. JUR. 2D Corporations § 1651; accord Homestore, 888 A.2d at 212 
(stating that while the advancement authority granted by the indemnification statutes 
is permissive, “mandatory advancement provisions are set forth in a great many 
corporate charters, bylaws and indemnification agreements”).  
 236 Id. at 213 (“The scope of an advancement proceeding is usually summary 
in nature and limited to determining the issue of entitlement in accordance with the 
corporation’s own uniquely crafted advancement provisions.”). 
 237 CALLISON & SULLIVAN, supra note 223 (explaining that partnership 
agreements usually contain indemnification provisions where the limited partnership 
promises to indemnify for liabilities incurred as a result of partnership business, as 
long as the liabilities are not the result of “bad faith, willful misconduct, or gross 
negligence” and that these provisions should be drafted to authorize advancement of 
litigation costs prior to a determination of liability while requiring repayment if it is 
determined that the partner breached the standard of care); see also Sr. Tour Players, 
853 A.2d at 130 n.23 (distinguishing between cases where an undertaking by an 
employee defendant was not required under Delaware corporate law since 
advancement was provided for under a corporation’s specific bylaws and was not 
conditioned on an undertaking, and cases where a corporation was entitled to deny 
advancement even where the corporate officer offered to submit to an undertaking 
since no mandatory advancement provision existed in the certificate of incorporation or 
bylaws). 
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the employees’ expectations of advancement based on KPMG’s 
prior practice of advancing legal fees constituted a property 
interest with which the government was not permitted to 
interfere.238 Second, the court suggested (although it admittedly 
declined to decide in this ruling) that all of the defendants were 
protected by a contract implied-in-fact (with the exception of 
Stein who had an express agreement with the company).239 
These conclusions, however, are flawed.  
The first flaw is that any expectation the employees’  
had based on KPMG’s “long-standing policy,” as well as the 
suggestion that a contract implied in fact existed, is misplaced 
since one of the stipulations between the government and 
KPMG was that the company’s practice of advancing and 
paying legal fees prior to February 2004 was “voluntary.”240 
Such a voluntary policy suggests that KPMG was free to 
exercise its discretion to deny advancement, either during the 
investigation or later during criminal proceedings, to any 
employee or former employee that it suspected did not act in 
good faith and was guilty of a criminal violation.241 Two factual 
circumstances in Stein highlight this flaw: First, KPMG 
refused to extend payments for legal fees to certain former 
employees despite their involvement in the investigation. 
Second, KPMG also refused to extend fee payment to current 
employees even after the court found a Sixth Amendment 
violation in Stein I. 
 With respect to the first circumstance, one might view 
KPMG as having already exercised such discretion under its 
voluntary practice when it declined to extend payment of legal 
fees to three former employees implicated in the alleged 
wrongdoing.242 Two of the former employees had left KPMG 
  
 238 Stein I, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 366. 
 239 Id. at 356, n.119.  
 240 Id. at 352, 340; see also Stein v. KPMG, LLP, 452 F. Supp. 2d 230 
(S.D.N.Y. 2006), rev’d, 486 F.3d 753, 762 n.3 (2d Cir. 2007) (stating in dictum that the 
stipulation by the defendants that KPMG chose to voluntarily advance legal fees in the 
past arguably estopped them from now arguing that KPMG had a contractual 
obligation—”implied or otherwise”—to pay their post-indictment legal fees, and that it 
is far from certain that KPMG would “lose on the merits” of any implied contract claim 
since the alleged “uniform practice” of paying legal fees for employees consists of “a 
single instance in which KPMG paid the legal fees of two partners indicted and 
convicted in a 1974 criminal case”). 
 241 See Advanced Mining Sys., Inc. v. Fricke, 623 A.2d 82, 84-85 (Del. Ch. 
1992) (holding that a mandatory indemnification provision in a corporate by-law which 
is silent as to advancement does not “deprive the board of its function . . . to evaluate 
the corporation’s interest with respect to advancement of expenses”). 
 242 Stein III, 495 F. Supp. 2d 390, 425 (S.D.N.Y. 2007).  
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prior to the start of the investigation, but were suspected in the 
misconduct partially through conduct prior to their departure 
from the firm and partially through their formation of a 
separate company which played a “central role in the 
transactions at issue.”243 Yet the court in Stein III did not find 
the rights of those defendants to have been violated, despite 
evidence from the KPMG voicemail that the firm would cover 
expenses for “any present and former members of the firm.”244 
Therefore, it may be argued that KPMG never intended to 
create an expectation that legal fees would be advanced 
unconditionally.  
The other factual circumstance is that even after the 
district court’s finding in Stein I that the government had 
violated the defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights, KPMG still 
refused to extend payment of the legal expenses for their 
defendant employees either voluntarily245 or by conceding a 
contractual obligation to do so.246 This is significant because  
the Stein I court had viewed stipulations by KPMG to the 
AUSAs that it had no legal obligation to pay fees as being 
borne of the firm’s own self-interest in avoiding an indictment 
and not necessarily out of its actual belief.247 Yet even with the 
government’s obstructions removed, KPMG chose to exercise 
discretion even with regards to defendants who were current 
employees during the course of the suspected criminal wrong-
doing. Such considerations cast further doubt on future courts’ 
efforts to reconcile such claims by attempting to infer what a 
company would have done, especially when a company chooses, 
  
 243 Id. at 426.  
 244 The Stein III court found that it could not be determined that KPMG had 
any legal obligation to defend, nor did the defendants show that the firm would have 
covered their legal costs “as a matter either of grace or of obligation, given that [they] 
left the firm so long ago.” Id. With respect to a third former defendant, the court found 
no intention of KPMG to cover his costs due to his departure under “strained 
circumstances” from the firm two years before the indictment, and that he had 
expressly released KPMG from any claims that he may have had against the firm. Id.  
 245 See Browning, Judge Raises New Concerns, supra note 200 (reporting a 
month after the Stein I decision was handed down that the firm had no intention of 
paying the legal fees for its defendant employees because while they had already paid 
$12 million in fees to that point, the employees had cost the firm $500 million by 
breaching their fiduciary duty). 
 246 United States v. Stein, 452 F. Supp. 2d 230, 260 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (noting 
that KPMG contested claims of a contract implied in fact by asserting that past 
decisions regarding payment of employee legal expenses were made pursuant to 
“voluntary, unilateral decisions . . . on a case by case basis”). 
 247 Stein I, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 345 n.54 (“KPMG had an interest in avoiding 
advancement of fees if its legal obligation to do so might be questioned, as the 
government might view advancement of fees as protecting culpable personnel.”).  
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as KPMG did, to change course in its discretion as an 
investigation wears on. 
A second major flaw in the court’s reasoning regarding 
the employees expectations is that KPMG arguably never 
intended to advance legal expenses to all employees being 
investigated by the DOJ. The only affirmative action taken by 
the company regarding advancement was to create an express 
contract for the two individuals the company unmistakably 
intended to cover: Jeffrey Stein and Richard Smith.248 Such 
action undercuts the argument that KPMG impliedly obligated 
itself to advance fees to all of its employees connected to the 
investigation. A better indication of the company’s true intent 
could be ascertained by looking at whether the company 
planned for such litigation expense issues by obtaining a 
liability insurance policy that provided protection in such 
instances.249 Such protection could make indemnification and 
advancement through company assets unnecessary.250  
  
 248 Id. at 339. See generally Karl E. Stauss, Indemnification in Delaware: 
Balancing Policy Goals and Liabilities, 29 DEL. J. CORP. L. 143 (2004) (pointing out, at 
least with corporations, the inherent risks in blanket authorizations and clauses 
regarding mandatory advancement).  
Mandatory advancement clauses have been broadly interpreted to apply, 
even in situations where the advancement request was borne out of a lawsuit 
brought by the company providing the advance. Specific contract language is 
needed to entitle a person to mandatory advancement. A provision mandating 
indemnification “to the full extent permitted by Delaware law” will not 
“deprive the board of its function under Section 145(e) to evaluate a 
corporation’s interest with respect to advancement of expenses.[“] Where a 
bylaw mandates the advance of expenses, it creates a vested right, which 
cannot be unilaterally terminated, to advances once a triggering event for 
advances occurs. Without a bylaw or contract mandating the advance of 
expenses, a board determination to advance their personal litigation expenses 
is treated as a self-dealing transaction, governed by entire fairness. “A 
rubber-stamp resolution authorizing advances will not pass muster.” 
Id. at 163-64 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted). 
 249 See David B. Bayless, Defending Your Client in the World of SEC 
Enforcement, Part 2: Cooperation and Litigation, SEC. LITIG. REP., Apr. 2006, at 1. The 
Bayless article tackles concerns arising from the Securities and Exchange 
Commission’s use of the Seaboard Report that are nearly identical to those emanating 
from the Thompson Memo, including pressure to cooperate with government 
investigations and a requirement that companies, in order to obtain settlements with 
the government, not exercise their right to indemnify individuals. Id. For corporations, 
this makes the purchase of a director and officer (“D&O”) insurance policy essential. Id. 
In addition, when purchasing such policies, companies can elect a “pay as you go” 
clause, which would permit advancement of defense costs on a current or quarterly 
basis. Id. But see John C. Tanner & David E. Howard, Blowing Whistles and Climbing 
Ladders: The Hidden Insurance Issues Behind Sarbanes-Oxley and Recent Corporate 
Governance Reform, ACC DOCKET, Apr. 2005, at 32, 35-37 (pointing out that many 
policies impose limits on cost coverage of government investigations, may contain 
terms that are subject to interpretation regarding coverage of certain costs, and may 
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B.  The Court’s Findings Regarding the Threats and 
Pressure Imposed by the Government 
In addition to finding that KPMG had a policy of 
advancing legal fees on which its employees were entitled to 
rely, the Stein decisions also focused on the effect that actions 
and threats by the government had on KPMG’s desire to 
advance fees.251 The court concluded first that the inherent 
threat of an indictment for failing to cooperate contained in the 
Thompson Memo caused KPMG to consider abandoning its 
policy of advancing legal fees, even before it first met with  
the AUSAs.252 One premise for this conclusion was the court’s 
belief that the Thompson Memo was “binding on all federal 
prosecutors.”253 Next, the court found that the threat of 
indictment was consistently reinforced by the USAO by 
focusing early and often on KPMG’s legal obligations regarding 
advancing legal fees and by allowing it to comply only with 
those obligations that were demonstrable.254 Third, the court 
found that the government’s conduct manifested a desire to 
minimize the involvement of defense counsel.255 Finally, the 
court determined that the firm’s decision to cease payments to 
any indicted employees and the conditions placed on the receipt 
of these payments were the product of direct pressure applied 
by the government pursuant to the Thompson Memo.256 Again, 
however, a number of weaknesses limit the effectiveness of the 
court’s decision.  
First, KPMG’s fear of prosecution had little, if anything, 
to do with the Thompson Memo and more to do with the 
government’s general discretion to bring an indictment, which 
would have effectively crippled the company. As the Stein I 
  
also contain rescission clauses which deny coverage in the event of particular instances 
of conduct, such as restating previously certified financial statements).  
 250 Bayless, supra note 249. But see William A. Boeck, Don’t Assume D&O 
Policy Covers Individuals’ Defense Expenses, BUS. INS., Nov. 6, 2006, at 10 (warning 
specifically in the wake of the Stein cases that where prosecutors attack corporate 
indemnification of defense expenses, the assumption by many defendants that D&O 
policies will fill this gap may be wrong if the policy contains a provision which triggers 
payment only once the company begins indemnifying its employees who are subject to 
the investigation). 
 251 Stein I, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 352; Stein III, 495 F. Supp. 2d at 400.  
 252 Stein I, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 352. 
 253 Id. at 338.  
 254 Id. at 352; Stein III, 495 F. Supp. 2d at 402.  
 255 See Stein I, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 352. 
 256 Id.  
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court recognized, this discretion was grounds for concern for 
KPMG following the investigation, indictment, and prosecution 
of KPMG’s former competitor, Arthur Andersen.257 Since 
prosecutorial discretion to seek an indictment against a 
company exists independently of the Thompson Memo 
guidelines,258 the decision to seek an indictment could hinge on 
the government’s satisfaction with a company’s cooperation 
irrespective of any procedural requirement259 that it be 
considered.  
Second, courts attempting to resolve such disputes 
regarding the advancement of legal fees risk intruding on the 
government’s compelling interest and legitimate discretion in 
prosecuting individuals and companies liable for misconduct.260 
Prosecutors have broad discretion in determining when and 
what charges to bring against a defendant.261 Claims of abuse of 
prosecutorial discretion are rarely reviewed as such discretion 
is grounded in the separation of powers doctrine of constitu-
tional theory.262 The Stein cases agreed with the need for such 
  
 257 Id. at 341; see also supra notes 74, 97 and accompanying text. 
 258 See McNulty Statement, supra note 4, at 2 (“Federal prosecutors could 
lawfully exercise their discretion to charge a corporation in many instances where we 
have stayed our hand.”).  
 259 The Stein I court found that AUSAs, in determining whether to bring an 
indictment against a company under the Thompson Memo, are “obliged” to consider a 
company’s cooperation and that the advancement of legal fees are a measurement of 
that cooperation. Stein I, 435 F. Supp. 2d. at 338. The court used this logic to 
differentiate between the Thompson Memo and the Holder Memo from 1999. Id. As 
authority for this holding, however, the court referred to a memorandum from Robert 
D. McCallum, Jr., Acting Deputy Attorney General. Memorandum from Robert D. 
McCallum, Jr., Deputy Attorney Gen. on Waiver of Corporate Attorney-Client and 
Work Product Protection to the Heads of Dep’t Components, U.S. Attorneys (Oct. 21, 
2005). However, this memo was dated October 21, 2005—over a year after the IRS 
made its criminal referral to the DOJ. Id. The meetings between the AUSAs and 
counsel for KPMG took place on February 25, 2004, twenty months before the 
McCallum memo. Stein I, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 341.  
 260 See Braswell v. United States, 487 U.S. 99, 115 n.9 (1988) (“White collar 
crime is ‘the most serious and all-pervasive crime problem in America today.’ Although 
this statement was made in 1980, there is no reason to think the problem has 
diminished in the meantime.” (quoting John Conyers, Jr., Corporate and White-Collar 
Crime: A View by the Chairman of the House Subcommittee on Crime, 17 AM. CRIM. L. 
REV. 287, 288 (1980)). 
 261 See Fisher, supra note 74, at 30 (“It is well settled that business entities 
may be indicted. . . . Prosecutors have discretion as to whom to prosecute. This 
discretion is limited by constitutional considerations . . . . [but otherwise] the 
prosecutor is virtually without legal limit as to whom she prosecutes . . . .” (paragraph 
break omitted)).  
 262 Greg Hollon, Note, After the Federalization Binge: A Civil Liberties 
Hangover, 31 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 499, 508 (1996); BENNETT L. GERSHMAN, 
PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT § 4:3, at 4-6 (2d ed. 2001) (cautioning that while judicial 
deference to prosecutors arises from the separation of powers doctrine and respect for 
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discretion, stating that “prosecutors appropriately are given 
great latitude in the arguments they make to juries,”263 and 
remarking on the importance of the government’s efforts to 
obtain cooperation during its investigations: 
Any government’s interest in investigating and fairly prosecuting 
crime is compelling. . . . In order properly to accomplish that task, 
the government must have the ability to make just charging 
decisions and to prevent obstruction of its investigations. Hence, no 
one disputes the proposition that a willingness to cooperate with the 
government is an appropriate consideration in deciding whether to 
charge an entity. Nor does anyone suggest that an entity’s 
obstruction of a government investigation . . . should be ignored in a 
charging decision.264 
In the post-Enron environment of company accountabil-
ity, this government interest is also seen through the increased 
use of regulation designed to provide greater oversight of 
company conduct.265 Legislatures and administrative agencies 
have responded to a surge in white collar crime in recent years 
with statutes that increase transparency and reporting 
requirements and enhance criminal penalties for fraudulent 
conduct.266 However, as white collar corruption becomes 
increasingly complex, prosecution of such conduct remains an 
essential enforcement and deterrence mechanism.267 While 
  
prosecutorial expertise, “[t]he combination of prosecutorial discretion and judicial 
passivity can be dangerous”). 
 263  Stein I, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 359. 
 264 Id. at 363; see also Stein III, 495 F. Supp. 2d at 427.  
 265 See McNulty Statement, supra note 4 (arguing that following the outbreak 
of corporate scandals after the collapse of Enron, the DOJ’s ensuing “vigor and action” 
in prosecuting corporate crime along with congressional reform “have helped to instill a 
climate of accountability in corporate boardrooms, and to restore investors’ confidence 
in the integrity of our markets”).  
 266 See, e.g., Sarbanes Oxley Act, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002) 
(establishing penalties for criminal fraud in corporate record keeping in Title VIII, and 
increasing criminal penalties for mail and wire fraud, as well as under federal 
sentencing guidelines for white-collar offenses under Title IX); Disclosure of Proxy 
Voting Policies and Proxy Voting Records by Registered Management Investment 
Companies, Securities Act Release No. 8188, Exchange Act Release No. 47,304, 
Investment Company Act Release No. 25,922 (Jan. 31, 2003) (requiring mutual fund 
companies to provide disclosures on proxy voting policies relating to portfolio securities 
they hold, due in part to recent corporate scandals that have generated new investor 
interest in issues of corporate governance, as well as due to increased voting power 
that mutual funds enjoy as major shareholders and their effects on corporate 
accountability). 
 267 See Fisher, supra note 74, at 31 (commenting on accuracy and credibility in 
financial reporting, the effects of distrust on shareholders, creditors, managers and 
regulators, and the potential need to make an example of Arthur Andersen); see also 
Wray & Hur, supra note 2, at 1106 (“Satisfaction of the government’s interests of 
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abuse of prosecutorial discretion and the potential for vindic-
tiveness by prosecutors are important concerns,268 forcing 
courts to evaluate such claims creates the risk that courts will 
overstep judicial authority under the separation of powers 
doctrine.269 
A third weakness limiting the effectiveness of the 
court’s holding is that decisions like those in Stein I and III 
may serve as catalysts for prosecutors to use alternative 
methods to obtain company cooperation, making legal fee 
advancement a moot point. The DOJ and USAO were chastised 
in Stein for placing an unfair burden on the individual  
KPMG defendants by denying them access to a source of funds 
they were lawfully entitled to for purposes of presenting a 
defense.270 However, the defendants’ access to these funds was 
subject to a second limitation: availability. Should a criminal 
indictment render a company insolvent, a separate burden 
would be placed on defendants wishing to gain access to these 
funds.271  
The negative financial impact that a formal indictment 
against a company has on that company’s assets and 
survivability may give prosecutors an interest in not seeking 
an indictment against that company.272 However, frustrating 
government investigations of illegal activity by burdening their 
acquisition of cooperation from a legitimate additional 
defendant—in this case the company—creates a risk that the 
government will simply bring an indictment, potentially 
rendering a company (as in the case of Arthur Andersen) 
  
retribution, deterrence, rehabilitation and restitution through the prosecution of 
culpable individuals will weigh against prosecution of the business entity.”). 
 268 Fisher, supra note 74, at 32 (discussing how prosecutors can obtain 
indictments with “relative ease” and by using “questionable or even contrived 
evidence”); see also, Hollon, supra note 262, at 508 (stating that a prosecutor’s charging 
decisions are entitled to the presumption that they were made in good faith); Note, 
Prosecutorial Vindictiveness in the Criminal Appellate Process: Due Process Protection 
After United States v. Goodwin, 81 MICH. L. REV. 194, 195-96 (1982).  
 269 Hollon, supra note 262, at 508. 
 270 Stein I, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 362.  
 271 See Tanner & Howard, supra note 249, at 46 (arguing that even where 
employees such as in-house attorneys have mandatory indemnification through state 
law or written agreements, “individual financial resources will be at risk if the 
company files for bankruptcy or becomes insolvent”); Bisceglia, supra note 223, at 710-
11. 
 272 See Thompson Memo, supra note 1, at 3 (explicitly raising adverse risks to 
shareholders, pension holders, and innocent employees as factors to consider in 
deciding whether to charge a company); McNulty Statement, supra note 4.  
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insolvent.273 This will place the burden of legal fees more 
heavily on defendants who would otherwise have sought 
company funds.274 Even assuming prosecutors did abuse their 
discretion in seeking an indictment, it is arguable whether a 
reversal or the dropping of any charges would restore the 
company’s financial position.275 
This Note does not claim that the Stein court erred in its 
conclusions, or misrepresented the issues in arriving at its 
holdings. It merely seeks to present the wealth of issues, 
arguments, and claims that could be made in response to the 
ruling issued by the Stein court, as well as may be made to 
other courts in similar, if not identical, situations moving 
forward.276 In the face of these complications related to judicial 
reconciliation of legal fee disputes for defendants charged with 
corporate crime, an easier solution is needed.277  
  
 273 See Irvin B. Nathan & Michael S. Lewis, Will the Recent KPMG Decisions 
Change White-Collar Defense? BUS. CRIMES BULL., Oct. 18, 2006 (arguing that 
companies “with an instinct for self-preservation[] may well recognize that advancing 
legal fees to indicted individuals is only likely to antagonize prosecutors who have 
discretion to indict the company”); Koppel, supra note 42; Fisher, supra note 74, at 30-
31, 32.  
 274 See Bisceglia, supra note 223, at 699 (arguing for the procurement of D&O 
liability insurance because “no matter how well disposed the board may be toward the 
embattled director, the corporation may have its own financial troubles and thus be 
unable to help him”). 
 275 See Fisher, supra note 74, at 32; see also Nathan & Lewis, supra note 273 
(stating that while the Stein decision was highly acclaimed, “it may ultimately produce 
little change in the world of white-collar criminal defense” since “the risk of a lawsuit 
for fees is far outweighed by the risk of alienating prosecutors by funding the legal 
defense of their quarry”). 
 276 See, e.g., United States v. Galante, No. 3:06CR161, 2006 WL 3826701, at 
*3 (D. Conn. Nov 28, 2006) (differentiating Stein in a case concerning federal 
prosecutors’ use of a legislative forfeiture provision). However, one can only hope that 
situations presenting similar fact patterns will be extremely limited; see also Nathan & 
Lewis, supra note 273 (projecting that the Stein I decision will “prompt corporate 
policy-makers to rethink charter and bylaw provisions and their past practices relating 
to reimbursement of legal fees to indicted or targeted officers, directors or employees”).  
 277 In December 2006, in order to bring the guidelines listed in the Thompson 
Memo into compliance with the decision handed down in Stein, the DOJ issued a 
revised memorandum instructing prosecutors that they “generally should not take into 
account whether a corporation is advancing attorneys’ fees to employees or agents 
under investigation and indictment.” Memorandum from Paul J. McNulty, Deputy 
Attorney Gen. to the Heads of Dep’t Components, U.S. Attorneys (Dec., 2006) 
[hereinafter, McNulty Memo]; see also Jason McLure, Justice Officials Moderate 
Thompson Memo Tactics, N.Y. L.J., Dec. 13, 2006, at 1. However the new guidelines, 
which still permit prosecutors to consider fee advancement in certain circumstances, 
have already come under criticism for their inadequacy since prosecutors seeking to 
consider fee advancement in their decisions to indict can obtain this permission from 
the Deputy Attorney General, which essentially still leaves the decision in the 
discretion of the prosecutors. See id. (reporting that obtaining permission to consider 
fee advancement is less rigorous than obtaining permission to push companies to waive 
privilege); Lynnley Browning, U.S. Moves to Restrain Prosecutors, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 13, 
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V.  PROPOSING A LEGISLATIVE SOLUTION 
In arriving at its final conclusions, the court in the Stein 
cases engaged in a long and complicated analysis of the argu-
ments presented by both the government and the defendants, 
while also balancing policy concerns. The court rejected the 
government’s claim that the right to counsel does not include 
the right to spend other people’s money.278 However, the govern-
ment’s argument indirectly presents a more viable solution for 
balancing its interest in preventing the obstructive use of legal 
fee advancement and a defendant’s right to use a lawful source 
of funding to secure counsel and mount a defense. This solution 
is the use of preliminary injunctive relief in future government 
claims of obstructive fee advancement by employers to 
employees. Such relief would be similar to the injunctions 
granted under current legislative forfeiture provisions.279  
A.  Use of Legislative Injunctive Restraints 
The use of legislative preliminary injunctions, similar to 
those at issue in Caplin and Monsanto,280 is a superior 
alternative to the approach taken by the Thompson Memo 
because it reduces the risk of subsequent disputes among the 
government, employers, and their employees over the advance-
ment of legal fees while withstanding constitutional scrutiny of 
Sixth Amendment claims. Such injunctions also alleviate the 
burden on future courts forced to reconcile similar claims and 
arguments, and they preserve a defendant’s Sixth Amendment 
rights prior to the need for judicial intervention to restore what 
the government has violated. This alternative would also 
minimize judicial intrusion on prosecutorial discretion, while at 
the same time limiting over-zealous prosecutors. This in turn 
reduces the risk of damage to legitimate criminal prosecutions 
caused by suppression of statements and other evidence and, in 
  
2006, at C1; Martha Neil, Thompson Memo Changes Not Enough, ABA Says, A.B.A. J. 
& REP., Dec. 15, 2006 (reporting the inadequacy of the new policy for waiver, which 
requires only “high level department approval”). 
 278 Stein I, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 367.  
 279 See Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 491 U.S. 617 (1989); 
United States v. Monsanto, 491 U.S. 600 (1989). 
 280 See discussion supra Part III.B.2. 
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cases like Stein, forced dismissal of unprosecuted criminal 
indictments should be tried on their merits.281  
The legislative injunction at issue in Caplin and 
Monsanto, which this Note suggests as a model, is the 
Continuing Criminal Enterprise Act (“CCE”).282 The CCE is one 
of two federal criminal statutes that were amended by the 
Comprehensive Forfeiture Act of 1984 (“CFA”)283 to give greater 
effect to government efforts to fight different types of crime.284 
The CCE, as modified by the CFA, authorizes the forfeiture of 
“property constituting, or derived from, any proceeds . . . 
obtained . . . as the result of such [drug] violation[s].”285 
Included in such property is the forfeiture of any “interest in, 
claims against, and property or contractual rights affording a 
source of control over, the continuing criminal enterprise.”286 
The statute also declares that any “right, title, and interest” in 
the property obtained via a violation of the drug law “vests  
in the United States upon the commission of the act giving  
rise to forfeiture” even when those assets are subsequently 
transferred to a third party.287 
The forfeiture statute has a significant preemptive 
feature. This feature gives the government the ability to apply 
for a restraining order or injunction in order “to preserve the 
availability of [the] property” either upon the filing of an 
indictment or information charging a violation, or prior to the 
filing of an indictment or information if the court determines 
that there is a substantial probability that the U.S. will prevail 
on the issue of forfeiture and that failure to restrain the 
property will result in its being made unavailable.288 The court 
must also weigh the need to preserve the property against  
  
 281 Stein III, 495 F. Supp. 2d at 427 (“This indictment charges serious crimes. 
They should have been decided on the merits as to every defendant.”). 
 282 21 U.S.C. §§ 848, 853 (2006). 
 283 Id. § 881(e). 
 284 See Roderick D. Vereen, Comment, Attorneys Rights to Fees Under the 
Comprehensive Forfeiture Act of 1984: The “Bona Fide Purchaser,” 16 S.U. L. REV. 407, 
408-09 (1989) (“[The CFA] revised the forfeiture provisions of both the RICO and the 
CCE statutes. . . . which attack[] the enterprises of drug trafficking and racketeer-
ing. . . . Congress believed that since profit and economic power were the motivating 
factors for this type of criminal activity enforcement of those statutes would strip these 
offenders and organizations of this economic power.”).  
 285 21 U.S.C. §853(a)(1) (2006). 
 286 Id. § 853(a)(3). 
 287 Id. § 853(c). However, an exception applies when the third party who has 
obtained the assets proves that he or she is a “bona fide purchaser” of the property 
“reasonably without cause to believe” it is forfeitable. Id. 
 288 Id. § 853(e). 
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the hardship on the individual whose assets have been 
“preserved.”289 The duration of the restraint is limited to ninety 
days, unless either good cause is shown to the court to extend 
the order, or an indictment is filed against the individual.290 
A carefully drawn statutory enactment allowing the 
government, with certain limitations, to request that compa-
nies be enjoined from advancing legal fees to certain employees 
can achieve the goals of easing judicial reconciliation, 
preserving defendants’ Sixth Amendment right to counsel, and 
limiting intrusion on prosecutorial discretion, while also 
addressing other policy concerns. Such a provision would 
consist of two parts. The first part would allow prosecutors, 
after initiating a formal investigation against an employee 
suspected of wrongdoing in the capacity of his employment, to 
seek, subject to limitations, a preliminary injunction from a 
court barring the advancement of legal fees from the employer 
to that employee. Like the CCE, the government would not be 
required to bring an indictment against the individual 
employee or the company. However, in order for the court to 
grant such an injunction, the government would be required to 
show to the magistrate evidence sufficient to obtain an indict-
ment against the company and a substantial likelihood that the 
fee advancement is being used for the purpose of obstructing 
the government’s investigation. In addition, all injunction 
requests would allow potential defendants as well as their 
employers to rebut the government’s claims through presenta-
tion of evidence sufficient to show either a lack of obstructive 
conduct or excessive hardship to the potential defendant.  
The first part of this proposed injunction provision 
accomplishes two goals. First, it preserves the government’s 
interest in obtaining cooperation and preventing obstruction by 
giving prosecutors the authority to seek judicial intervention in 
the prevention of companies using fee advancement as a mode 
of improperly obstructing a criminal investigation.291 At the 
same time, the government’s interest would be sufficiently 
checked by setting a minimum on what must be proven to 
  
 289 Id. § 853(e)(1)(B)(ii). 
 290 Id. 
 291 See Wray & Hur, supra note 2, at 1146 (discussing the DOJ’s “more 
aggressive pursuit of obstructive conduct since the Thompson Memo’s issuance,” but 
also arguing that companies which impede investigators have for a long time been 
more likely to face criminal prosecution at the hands of the Justice Department).  
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establish the necessary urgency implicating that interest.292 
Second, this provision would preserve the Sixth Amendment 
right to counsel for individual defendants by placing the 
burden on the government to show good cause for judicial inter-
ference with a company’s right to advance fees to its employees. 
It also removes the government’s unrestrained consideration of 
legal fee advancement in its evaluation of a company’s 
cooperation, alleviating the threat contained in the Thompson 
Memo of prosecutors seeking an indictment against the 
company.293 Should the court grant the injunction, the company 
would have no choice but to comply. Should the court deny the 
injunction, prosecutors would be otherwise barred, both before 
and after the denial of the motion, from considering fee 
advancement in deciding whether or not to seek an indictment. 
The second part of the injunction provision would place 
additional limits on when such an injunction would be appro-
priate. First, prosecutors would not be permitted to request an 
injunction when it would be construed as forcing an employer 
to violate the terms of a statutory obligation requiring the 
advancement of legal fees. Second, prosecutors would not be 
able to seek an injunction that would intrude on any insurance 
policy obtained by the company from a third party insurer for 
the purpose of guaranteeing the availability of advanced legal 
fees. Third, prosecutors would be unable to seek an injunction 
when a company already has an existing uncontradicted and 
express agreement with its employees to advance legal fees, 
unless prosecutors can show that the agreement was put in 
place for purposes of obstructing the government’s investiga-
tion. In such a case the government would be required to prove 
the obstruction in accordance with part one of the provision. 
Courts would also be required to weigh the government’s 
interest in injunctive relief against any hardship to the 
defendant and could limit the time period of any restraint 
based on those perceived hardships. Finally, if none of the 
  
 292 See Stein I, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 363 (conceding the need of the government 
to prevent obstruction in its criminal investigations, but pointing out that “the 
Thompson Memorandum does not say that payment of legal fees may cut in favor of 
indictment only if it is used as a means to obstruct an investigation”). “If the 
government means to take the payment of legal fees into account in making charging 
decisions only where the payments are part of an obstruction scheme—and thereby 
narrowly tailor its means to its ends—it would be easy enough to say so.” Id. at 364. 
 293 See Wray & Hur, supra note 2, at 1103 (stating that the use of alternatives 
such as “pre-trial diversion” agreements or “deferred prosecution and non-prosecution 
agreements,” encourages greater cooperation by removing the “all-or-nothing choice 
between indicting (and destroying) a company and giving it a complete ‘pass’”).  
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above limitations apply and if the court finds that abrogation  
of fee advancement is necessary, nothing in the injunction 
provision would intrude on a company’s right or obligation to 
indemnify its employees at the conclusion of any litigation in 
accordance with any obligation imposed by statute or by a 
company’s bylaws, partnership agreement, or other express 
contractual obligations.  
These limitations accomplish a number of goals. The 
first limitation protects the interests of states that wish to 
preserve the use of indemnification and fee advancement as a 
significant inducement to attract capable individuals to 
positions of high responsibility in a company.294 The second and 
third limitations prevent companies that may only be subject to 
permissive statutes dealing with fee advancement from being 
effectively punished by prosecutors for their attempts to plan 
for such a contingency, while encouraging other companies that 
have not yet done so to undertake one of these options in an 
effort to eliminate the issue from consideration going 
forward.295 All three limitations would constitute express legal 
obligations of companies to advance legal fees—obligations that 
the Thompson Memo had recognized by prohibiting prosecutors 
from considering such mandatory payments as a failure to 
cooperate. Thus, prosecutors would be in no worse position 
than they had voluntarily undertaken under the Thompson 
Memo,296 while also receiving an additional tool to combat a 
company’s obstruction under the guise of cooperation. The 
expensive nature of complex white-collar criminal litigation, 
such as that presented in the Stein cases, would also be taken 
into consideration by courts evaluating hardship to defendants. 
  
 294 See supra note 230 and accompanying text.  
 295 See Jonathan C. Dickey, Recent Decisions Concerning the Right of 
Advancement of Defense Costs, SEC. LITIG. REP., Feb. 2006, at 6 (explaining while 
companies can do only so much to mitigate the risk of being punished by prosecutors 
for supporting officers and directors through indemnification and advancement, certain 
steps such as amending company bylaws to make advancement mandatory; contractual 
exclusions eliminating the obligation to advance fees to employees who plead guilty to 
criminal misconduct; and purchasing non-rescindable D&O liability insurance are 
some suggestions to preserve the right to pay for the defense of officers and employees); 
see also Falvey & Taylor, supra note 229, at 16. 
 296 Thompson Memo, supra note 1; McNulty Statement, supra note 4 
(removing from consideration a company’s statutory obligation to pay employee defense 
costs in the government’s evaluation of that company’s cooperation).  
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B. Arguments Against and Rebuttals in Favor of the Use  
of Injunctive Restraints 
While this Note proposes using injunctive restraint as a 
tool against obstructive fee advancement, injunctive provisions 
similar to the one proposed have been increasingly criticized 
out of concerns pertaining to prosecutorial abuse as well as 
risks regarding availability and adequacy of counsel.297 The 
first criticism is that such injunctive provisions have 
undesirable impacts on the adversarial criminal justice 
system.298 The argument is that such provisions remove any 
incentive for private criminal defense attorneys to represent 
defendants whose assets are subject to pre-trial restraint 
because the defendant’s ability to cover his legal expenses is 
suddenly called into question.299 Under forfeiture provisions 
involving drug offenses, if the defendant is convicted, the 
restrained assets would become forfeited, potentially leaving 
nothing to cover attorney’s fees.300 Critics might argue that the 
proposal suggested by this Note creates a similar risk through 
the possibility that defendants who are found guilty would no 
longer be entitled to indemnification from their respective 
companies, a notable concern where defense costs can reach 
extraordinary levels.301 
A second argument against the use of an injunction 
provision is that such a restraint on a defendant’s assets has a 
direct implication on his or her Sixth Amendment right to 
counsel of choice and, more indirectly, on the right to the 
effective assistance of counsel.302 Third, it may be argued that 
  
 297 See Winick, supra note 192; Berube, supra note 110, at 1395.  
 298 Winick, supra note 192, at 771-72, 777; Lisa F. Rackner, Against Forfeiture 
of Attorney’s Fees Under RICO: Protecting the Constitution’s Rights of Criminal 
Defendants, 61 NYU L. REV. 124, 126-27 (1986). 
 299 Berube, supra note 110, at 1395; Winick, supra note 192, at 779, 785. The 
argument is that many private criminal defense attorneys require a fee that 
defendants cannot afford to pay if their assets are seized. Id. at 773. This argument is 
furthered in the sense that criminal defendants whose assets are subject to forfeiture 
and have been frozen prior to an indictment, can claim indigency, and have counsel 
appointed to them, while defendants whose assets have not been frozen are unable to 
claim indigency, are unable to retain counsel since “lawyers will refuse to represent 
him, fearing subsequent forfeiture of their fees.” Rackner, supra note 298, at 134. 
 300 This concern is increased by the requirement that the illegal assets 
transferred to a third party are also subject to forfeiture, including legal fees paid to 
defense attorneys. Vereen, supra note 284, at 409. 
 301 See supra note 154 and accompanying text.  
 302 Winick, supra note 192, at 784-85, 800-01 (arguing that, even where courts 
have accepted government contentions that giving defendants who have had their 
assets forfeited appointed counsel satisfies the requirements of the Sixth Amendment, 
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such an injunctive provision would not remove the risk of abuse 
by prosecutors seeking pre-trial freezing of assets in order to 
purposely eliminate a defendant’s chosen defense counsel.303 
However, these arguments are weakened by a number of 
considerations.  
1.  Overcoming Negative Impacts on the Adversarial 
Criminal Justice System 
First, the arguments regarding the impact of preemp-
tive restraints and forfeiture on the adversary system rely on 
the assumption that private defense attorneys will be hesitant 
to represent defendants out of the fear that they either will not 
be paid or that the government will forfeit those fees that have 
already been already paid.304 Second, the argument also relies 
on the absence of any exception for legitimate attorney’s fees305 
and the overly broad use of seizures and injunctions by prose-
cutors in freezing the defendant’s personal assets, making no 
distinction between those which are tainted by the illegality 
and those which are legitimate. The effect is to leave the defen-
dants with little or no other source to finance their defense.306 
  
“[a] criminal justice system relying on appointed rather than retained counsel . . . is not 
the adversary system contemplated by the sixth amendment, no matter how effective 
such appointed advocates are”). 
 303 Id. at 777-78 (arguing that such a result was neither anticipated nor 
intended by Congress); Peter W. Salsich, III, A Delicate Balance: Making Criminal 
Forfeiture a Viable Law Enforcement Tool And Satisfying Due Process After United 
States v. James Daniel Good Real Property, 39 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 585, 586 (1995). This 
was also an express concern and conclusion of the Stein court when it ruled that one of 
the purposes of the AUSAs in exerting such pressure on KPMG pursuant to the 
Thompson Memo was their “desire to minimize the involvement of defense attorneys.” 
Stein I, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 353.  
 304 Winick, supra note 192, at 777-81; Berube, supra note 110, at 1395.  
 305 While an exception is carved out under the CCE for bona fide recipients of 
potentially forfeitable funds who are without cause to believe that the received funds 
are forfeitable, supra note 287, defense attorneys are almost always excluded from this 
category. Winick, supra note 192, at 785 (“[C]riminal defense lawyers are almost 
inevitably on notice that their clients’ payments may be from the proceeds of crime.”); 
Vereen, supra note 284, at 410-11; see also supra note 296.  
 306 See Jon E. Gordon, Prosecutors Who Seize Too Much and the Theories They 
Love: Money Laundering, Facilitation, and Forfeiture, 44 DUKE L.J. 744, 744-45 (1995) 
(“Since 1970, federal prosecutors have increasingly relied on civil and criminal 
forfeiture as tools for law enforcement. . . . [This] gives prosecutors undesirable power 
to seize property.”); see also Winick, supra note 192, at 770-71 (arguing that the ease 
with which prosecutors obtain pre-trial restraining orders combined with the threat of 
post-conviction forfeiture of assets “have deterred or prevented private criminal 
defense attorneys from taking such cases,” and give prosecutors “almost unfettered 
discretion to deprive defendants of the use of their assets to hire counsel of choice”). 
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However, the solution proposed in this Note assuages these 
concerns. 
The injunction provision proposed here would actually 
give private defense counsel less reason to hesitate since it is 
not concerned with the seizure of illegal, and therefore forfeit-
able, assets such as in drug cases, but rather with preventing 
legal assets from being used for illegal purposes. As a result, 
the provision would not subject fees already paid to defense 
attorneys to any retroactive forfeiture by the government and 
would only apply to the further advancement of legal fees  
from the employer to the employee, leaving the employee’s 
personal assets unaffected. Thus, the employee would be free to 
expend his own assets in retaining an attorney for his 
defense307 since all sources of personal financial income, such as 
an employee’s salary and investment income (assuming no 
other illegitimacy) are preserved. As a result, private defense 
counsel would receive some compensation from the defendant’s 
personal assets, while still retaining the prospect of indemni-
fication at the conclusion of the trial, alleviating at least some 
of the risk that attorneys will be deterred from representing 
such defendants.308 Additionally, not subjecting fees already 
paid to retroactive forfeiture and preservation of a defendant’s 
personal assets prevents prosecutors from sweeping too broadly 
in their application of such a provision.309  
  
 307 Winick, supra note 192, at 811 (“[The problem] is not whether exercise of 
the right to counsel of choice can be regulated, such as by restrictions on the choice of 
counsel who is otherwise engaged in order to prevent undue delay, or on the choice of 
an attorney disqualified by a factor such as a conflict of interest. Rather, it is whether 
the right may be completely destroyed by governmental action that renders the 
defendant unable to choose any private counsel.”). Since the provision leaves a 
defendant’s personal assets intact, such a concern would not be implicated under this 
proposal. As critics such as Winick note, “There is a vast difference between overriding 
a defendant’s choice of a particular lawyer and preventing him from employing any 
lawyer at all.” Id.  
 308 See Browning, Judges Press, supra note 33 (reporting that in at least one 
white collar criminal case against a former Enron accountant, retained defense counsel 
continued to represent the defendant at a “small fraction of his usual charges” because 
he was “convinced of her innocence”); Stein III, 495 F. Supp. 2d 390, 423-24 (S.D.N.Y. 
2007) (finding that while some of the KPMG defendants had gone into debt in financing 
their defenses, most of the defendants were in “better financial circumstances,” and 
only one was threatened with a motion to withdraw by their chosen counsel). 
 309 One example of the broad application of forfeiture provisions in criminal 
cases is seen in charges of money laundering where, when dealing with assets subject 
to forfeiture, “dirty money” that is tainted by the alleged illegality is mixed with “clean 
money” that is unconnected. Gordon, supra note 306, at 744. When prosecutors have 
great difficulty sorting the dirty from the clean, they may attempt to try and seize it 
all. Id. at 744-45.  
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2.  Overcoming Negative Impacts on Rights to Counsel 
of Choice and Effective Assistance of Counsel 
Second, criticism based on the impact of injunctive 
restraint on a defendant’s rights to counsel of choice and the 
effective assistance of counsel is also addressed by the 
provision suggested in this Note. Part of this concern is based, 
again, on current forfeiture provisions which leave defendants 
with no other source of funding for their defense.310 Another 
source of this concern, however, is that private defense 
attorneys who agree to take on such cases are presented with a 
conflict of interest by having a pecuniary interest in the 
outcome of a criminal litigation.311 However, the narrow 
application of the provision recommended here subverts these 
concerns. Under this proposal, prosecutors would be unable to 
request a restraint of fee advancement in cases where such a 
restraint contravenes a statutory obligation imposed by the 
state or impinges on a company’s clearly demonstrated legal 
obligation to its employees through express provisions in their 
bylaws or other contractual agreement. This provision would 
therefore protect any property interest claim in fee advance-
ment that an employee may have.312 To the extent that the 
government can seek such a restraint, it would be limited to 
the prosecutor’s ability to show that the fee advancement is 
being used for purposes of, or in connection with, efforts to 
obstruct their investigation, in which case the advancement 
would further an illegal interest not protected under the 
Constitution. Thus, even where a company is not protected by a 
prior existing legal obligation, either contractual or statutory, 
as long as their voluntary advancement of fees to investigated 
employees is done in good faith, the government will not be 
permitted to intrude. 
  
 310 See Winick, supra note 192, at 785; Rackner, supra note 298, at 135; 
Berube, supra note 110, at 1395.  
 311 Rackner, supra note 298, at 140-41 (arguing that such a conflict could 
violate the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to conflict-free counsel); Winick, supra 
note 192, at 776-77 (discussing the added risk that defense attorneys will be 
representing a criminal defendant on a contingency basis, presenting an ethical 
violation of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct).  
 312 To the extent that a company uses a third party insurer to provide 
indemnification and advancement protection in the event of litigation, the problem 
could be avoided entirely.  
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3.  Overcoming Risks of Prosecutorial Abuse 
Third, the limitations in the proposal address the 
concerns of prosecutorial abuse.313 These arguments are based 
on a number of factors. The first is that prosecutors have 
increasingly relied on forfeiture provisions in their efforts to 
fight crimes such as money laundering, racketeering, drug 
trafficking, and mail or wire fraud.314 The second is that as this 
reliance has increased, so has prosecutors’ dependency on 
theories315 that allow them to sweep more broadly in order to 
seize and restrain a larger portion of a defendant’s assets while 
also enjoying a low burden of proof to establish the grounds 
necessary to implement the restraint.316 The provision proposed 
here eliminates these risks of abuse for a number of reasons. 
First, prosecutorial reliance on this provision will be 
limited since, as was originally intended in the Thompson 
Memo, it is intended to assist prosecutors in deciding when to 
bring criminal charges against a company. As the memo itself 
stated, instances in which a company will be subject to indict-
ment will be only in a minority of cases.317 Second, by  
placing the decision in the hands of a court, theoretically the 
only thing the prosecution can do to abridge the advancement 
of legal fees is request an injunction.318 Until the court grants 
  
 313 See Gordon, supra note 306, at 744-45 (warning against giving prosecutors 
“undesirable power to seize property”); Salsich, supra note 303, at 585-86.  
 314 Gordon, supra note 306, at 744.  
 315 An example of this is prosecutorial use of certain theories such as “taint” or 
“facilitation.” See id. at 744-45. The premise behind these theories is that prosecutors 
seeking the restraint of “dirty” money obtained as a result of money laundering or drug 
transactions will also seize “clean” money, not obtained through these activities by 
claiming either that the clean money was used to facilitate the illegal transaction, or 
that the dirty money was commingled with the clean money, causing it to be tainted 
and subject to forfeiture. Id. at 755.  
 316 Id. at 749. Under a number of forfeiture provisions prosecutors use, only a 
standard of probable cause is required to effectuate the restraint. See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. 
§ 853 (e)(2) (1994) (allowing the government to obtain a pre-indictment temporary 
restraining without notice or opportunity for a hearing order upon a showing of 
probable cause that the property is forfeitable, and that notice would jeopardize the 
availability of the property for forfeiture); see also Monsanto, 491 U.S. at 615; Gordon, 
supra note 306, at 749-50. 
 317 Thompson Memo, supra note 1, at 1. 
 318 In this way, such a proposal also alleviates a potential conflict of interest 
created by the McNulty Memo, which requires prosecutors wishing to consider fee 
advancement as a failure to cooperate to obtain permission from the Deputy Attorney 
General. See supra note 277. By requiring a court to consider the merits of an 
injunction on the advancement of legal fees from employers to employees, this 
provision inserts the objectiveness of a neutral magistrate, eliminating the risk of 
abuse by prosecutors. See, e.g., Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 449-55 
(1971) (invalidating a warrant authorizing the Fourth Amendment search and seizure 
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one, companies are free to advance. Third, as preserving the 
availability of forfeitable property is not a concern, a higher 
burden of proof, such as a “clear and convincing evidence” stan-
dard, should be required to establish the necessary presump-
tion of obstruction to warrant the issuance of an injunction. 
This would require prosecutors to be more selective and 
present only the more egregious cases of potential misconduct. 
Furthermore, even critics of current forfeiture provisions 
have acknowledged that prosecutors advancing attenuated 
claims have achieved only limited success in court with such 
theories.319 Thus, vesting the decision in the hands of a court 
serves as an effective barrier to prosecutorial abuse. Finally, 
binding prosecutors to a higher burden of proof to show intent 
on the part of the company to commit obstruction ensures that 
some measure of evidence and not mere conclusory statements 
will further limit risks of prosecutorial abuse. While this may 
seem like a substantial limitation to put on prosecutors, should 
a motion for the restraint of fee advancement be denied and 
should company conduct warrant such an action, prosecutors 
would still possess the ability to seek an indictment against  
the company for obstruction. This would serve as an effective 
deterrent to misconduct on the part of the employer.  
VI.  CONCLUSION 
In the effort to reform the balance among prosecutors, 
individual defendants, and the role of private companies in 
white collar criminal cases, special concerns must be granted to 
the interests of all parties involved. The ability to place  
limits on prosecutorial abuse, establish effective deterrents  
to company misbehavior, and encourage companies subject to 
white-collar criminal investigations to plan for contingencies 
not only helps to remove barriers to an effectuation of the 
  
of a defendant’s automobile where it is not issued by a “neutral and detached 
magistrate,” and holding that a state’s Attorney General cannot serve as a neutral, 
detached magistrate for the purpose of determining probable cause and issuing 
warrants). “[T]he whole point of [this] basic rule . . . is that prosecutors and policemen 
simply cannot be asked to maintain the requisite neutrality with regard to their own 
investigations—the ‘competitive enterprise’ that must rightly engage their single-
minded attention.” Id. at 450.  
 319 Gordon, supra note 306, at 760 (“Prosecutors have enjoyed mixed success 
in achieving forfeiture . . . under [a civil forfeiture provision] under the facilitation 
theory. . . . [S]everal courts have applied the theory to justify forfeiture . . . [while] [o]n 
the other hand, most attempts to apply the theory to accounts containing proceeds of 
other offenses have failed, and some courts have rejected the theory altogether.”). 
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interests for all involved, but also preserves the ideal of  
the adversary system—assessing responsibility for culpable 
conduct and meting out proper punishment while ensuring a 
fair trial for defendants. While the court in Stein was forced to 
embark on an arduous fact-finding process in order to resolve 
competing interests on both sides of the investigation, a more 
balanced and direct approach, which preserves the interests on 
both sides and reduces the risk of disputes and abuse, presents 
a superior alternative for courts to resolve future controversies 
over these matters.  
This Note analyzed the resolutions the Stein court had 
to make with respect to the actions and intentions of the 
government, KPMG, and the KPMG employees who were 
subject to the investigation; the company’s obligations to its 
employees; and the company’s reaction to the Thompson Memo. 
The court struggled to apply these facts in its determination of 
the employees’ rights to effective assistance and counsel of 
choice under the Sixth Amendment and of the scope of the 
protections afforded by those rights. The difficulties of such a 
piecemeal, fact-intensive analysis demonstrate the need for a 
clearer alternative.  
The injunctive provision proposed here would simplify 
this process for future courts by removing from contention 
many of the disputed issues in Stein. The proposed provision 
would encourage both the government and private employers to 
preempt these contentions and refrain from abusive conduct. 
The narrowly drawn injunctive provision suggested should also 
assuage fears of abuse that arise with respect to similar 
provisions in other criminal contexts. The injection of the court 
as an intermediary to ensure an early and neutral considera-
tion of the facts presented and the interests implicated would 
significantly limit, or at least ease the resolution of, Sixth 
Amendment violations to the right to the assistance of counsel 
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